Resisting Spaciocide

Notes on the Spatial Struggle in Israel-Palestine

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Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, West Jerusalem, Israel
Riwaq: Centre for Architectural Conservation, Ramallah, West Bank
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, West Jerusalem, Israel
Arab Center for Alternative Planning, Eilaboun, Israel

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## Contents

- Preface v
- Research Aims vi
- Structure of Publication vii
- Research Methodology vii
- Notes on Terminology viii
- List of Illustrations x

### 1. Introduction: The Spatial Context 1

- 2. Mechanisms of Spatial Domination 7
  - 2.1 Territory and Identity 11
  - 2.2 Institutional and Diffuse Power 11
  - 2.3 Legislative Mechanisms 17
  - 2.4 Spatial Fragmentation and Enclavisation 20
  - 2.5 The Politics of Separation 22
  - 2.6 Summary 24

### 3. Modes of Spatial Resistance 27

- 3.1 Spatial Analysis 28
- 3.2 Professional Advocacy 31
- 3.3 Political Advocacy 32
- 3.4 Critical Speculation 33
- 3.5 Physical Intervention 36
- 3.6 Summary 37

### 4. Conclusion: Reframing the Spatial Struggle 39

- 4.1 Working Within the System 41
- 4.2 Working Outside of the System 42
- 4.3 Planning an Alternative Future 43

- End Notes 47

- Interview Notes 53
Fig. 1 – Israeli settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim in the West Bank

Fig. 2 – The ‘Wall’ as it runs between Shu’fat refugee camp (left) and Pisgat Ze’ev settlement (right)
Preface

For many years my grandmother was a resident of East Jerusalem, and my family would make sporadic visits to the city in the 1980s and 1990s. Sometimes for months at a time we would stay with our Palestinian friends on the eastern slopes of the Mount of Olives, where Ma'aleh Adumim – the Israeli settlement occupying the surrounding hilltops (Fig. 1) – formed a prominent backdrop, growing dramatically each time we returned. Even as a young teenager with little understanding of the political situation, I still registered the stark contrast between this rapid urban expansion and our friends’ own ten year wait for an Israeli permit to build a family home on their own land.

My research for this publication was born out of these childhood experiences in Jerusalem, and a resulting desire to understand the role of architecture – my own chosen profession – in shaping the physical terrain of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, by extension, whether there might also be a role for architects in untangling the seemingly both irreconcilable and indivisible built environment that now exists.

In the summer of 2009 I worked a two month residency with the Decolonizing Architecture (DA) studio in Bethlehem. This was an invaluable opportunity to ‘survey’ the current situation in Israel-Palestine first hand and, above all, to speak with numerous professionals, academics and activists (Palestinians, Israelis and internationals) intimately familiar with the wider contours and everyday manifestations of the spatial conflict. The interviews recorded for this research are in many ways just a small snapshot of the many discussions and colloquiums that took place during the summer, and which shaped the thinking presented in this publication.

Of the many individuals who contributed – wittingly or unwittingly – to this research, I would firstly like to thank all of the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this research: Karen Pacht (Bimkom), Judeh Jamal, Farhat Muhawi (Riwaq), Yazid Anani (Birzeit), Jeff Halper (ICAHD), and Jumanah Essa-Hadad and Enaya Banna-Geries (ACAP). I must also thank Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal and Eyal Weizman, coordinators of DA, for their invaluable insights and hospitality last summer. In addition, I should thank the many other DA participants (in many different ways), particularly Tashy Endres who collaborated in several of the interviews, and Mary Mastella, Nina Kolowratnik, Sean Murphy, Nasser Abrourahme and Nada Ghandour-Demiri for their enthusiastic input. Thanks must also go to my masters dissertation tutor Adam Sharr for his endless advice, and for encouraging me to broaden my reading in architectural and cultural theory. Finally, I would like to thank the al-Rifai family for the friendship, support and unending hospitality that they have offered over the past 27 years.
Research Aims

The aims of the research presented in this publication are to explore the architectural processes (mechanisms of ‘spatial domination’) that have shaped, and are continuing to shape, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to document and appraise the modes of ‘spatial resistance’ that are being employed to counteract these.
Structure of Publication

This publication is structured around two core chapters, ‘Mechanisms of Spatial Domination’ (Chapter 2) and ‘Modes of Spatial Resistance’ (Chapter 3). The first of these outlines the mechanisms and processes by which a multitude of Israeli ‘actors’ have been able to establish and maintain a condition of spatial ‘hegemony’ in the territory of Israel-Palestine, and how these practices are intrinsically linked with the gradual destruction of the Palestinian ‘national space’. The second documents the ways in which individuals and organisations from a broad range of backgrounds (including both Palestinians and Israelis) are engaged in modes of spatial agency which ‘resist’ these processes.

The ‘Preface’, ‘Notes on Terminology’ and ‘Introduction’ (Chapter 1) are intended to set the scene for the publication, both in terms of the motivations for the research and by introducing the reader to the present spatial configuration of the territory of Israel-Palestine and some of the terminology that is crucial to understanding the discussion of the spatial conflict.

The ‘Conclusion’ (Chapter 4) offers an overview of the strategic implications and possibilities of the modes of spatial resistance documented in Chapter 3 and how these relate to the mechanisms of spatial domination in Chapter 2 and the wider socio-political struggle in Israel-Palestine. The conclusion is followed by an exhaustive ‘End Notes’ section summarising references and brief profiles of the individuals and organisations interviewed during the research.

Research Methodology

Given the sensitive and multifaceted nature of the research area, a number of techniques were used to gather, synthesise and verify the information that is presented. The most fundamental component was the field research carried out in Israel and the West Bank in the summer of 2009. This research included documented interviews, informal discussions and debates with people from many different backgrounds, and visits to a number of the locations referred to in these pages. All of these experiences were fundamental to the shaping of the core arguments in this publication. In addition, a wide ranging review of literature was carried out relating to the history, cultural context and architectural dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, a series of original syntheses of geographical information were produced to support and supplement the text.

A few limitations to the research should be noted. Firstly, the research does not investigate the Golan Heights (the region of Syrian and Lebanese territory annexed by Israel since 1967) since it is not a part of the Israeli-Palestinian territorial conflict and, as such, the region is also excluded from the maps that are presented. Secondly, since it was not possible to conduct research in the Gaza Strip due to access restrictions, the publication tends to discuss ‘spatial resistance’ in a way that is likely to be more applicable to Israel and the West Bank. In conjunction with this, reference to the Palestinian Authority (PA) relates to the de-facto administration dominated by the Fatah party in the West Bank, and not the Hamas administration in Gaza.
Notes on Terminology

There are a number of key terms used in this publication that require explanation. A selection of the fundamental terms, particularly relating to territories and population groups, are therefore explained here. (Cross-referenced terms are shown in italics.)

*Israel-Palestine*

The term used here to refer to the geographic territory between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea; the region defined as ‘Palestine’ during the period of the British Mandate of Palestine (1917-48), comprising what are now Israel and the *OPTs* (Fig. 3). This definition does not include the Golan Heights, an area of Syrian and Lebanese territory occupied by Israel since 1967.

*Israel*

The conventional term referring to the State of Israel and also to its territory within the *Green Line*.

*Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs)*

The OPTs refer to the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

*The Green Line*

The name given to the 1949 armistice lines agreed between the new State of Israel and the remaining *Palestinian* territories controlled by Egypt (the Gaza Strip) and Jordan (the West Bank) after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. These lines are often referred to as the pre-1967 borders, and are the internationally recognised borders between *Israel* and the OPTs.
Areas A, B, C
The three primary administrative definitions of the territories within the West Bank since the Oslo Accords during the 1990s (Fig. 4). Area A (18%) is under full control of the PA. Area B (22%) is under civil control of the PA and military control of Israel. Area C (60%) is under full Israeli control.³

Israeli
The term used to refer to that of the Israeli establishment, and to those with citizenship of the State of Israel. Here, ‘Jewish-Israeli’ and ‘Palestinian-Israeli’ are used to refer to the primary ethno-national groups within the state.

Palestinian
The term used here to refer to the native non-Jewish residents of Israel-Palestine prior to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and their descendants. This includes the various Arab groups within the OPTs and Israel today (excluding Mizrahi Jews), and a wider Diaspora. Here, the term Palestinian-Israeli is used to refer to those with Israeli citizenship. It should be noted that members of some Arab minorities in Israel are less likely to self-identify as Palestinian.⁴

Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
Political umbrella organisation formed in 1964 to represent the rights and interests of the Palestinian people. Unlike the PA, which only represents Palestinians living in the OPTs, the PLO officially represents the entire Palestinian Diaspora.

Palestinian Authority (PA)
The Palestinian Authority (PA) is the political authority in the Palestinian-administered areas of the OPTs (Areas A and B) set up in 1995 under the Oslo Accords. Although its structure resembles that of an autonomous government, the PA does not have territorial sovereignty and operates under an umbrella of overall Israeli control.⁵

Zionism
The political movement – founded at the end of the 19th century by European Jews – for the establishment of a Jewish ‘national’ homeland in the Middle East. Since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, Zionism is the term used for the political movement supporting Israel as a Jewish state.
**List of Illustrations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig. 1</th>
<th>Israeli settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim in the West Bank</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 2</td>
<td>The ‘Wall’ as it runs between Shu’fat refugee camp and Pisgat Ze’ev settlement</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 3</td>
<td>Map of de-jure and de-facto political divisions in Israel-Palestine, 2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 4</td>
<td>Map of Jewish Settlements and Palestinian towns in the West Bank, 2002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 5</td>
<td>Approximate distributions of Jewish and Palestinian populations in Israel-Palestine in 2009.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 6</td>
<td>Approximate distributions of Jewish and Palestinian populations in Israel-Palestine in 2009.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 7</td>
<td>Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices in Jerusalem region</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 8</td>
<td>Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices in southern ‘Triangle’ region</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 9</td>
<td>Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices around Nazareth</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 10</td>
<td>Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices around Ramallah</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 11</td>
<td>Map of zoning in East Jerusalem by the Israeli ‘Jerusalem Municipality’</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 12</td>
<td>A house undergoing demolition in East Jerusalem</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 13</td>
<td>Palestinians waiting at Huwarra checkpoint on the edge of the West Bank city of Nablus</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 14</td>
<td>Territory accessible with Israeli ID, West Bank ID and Gaza ID</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 15</td>
<td>Allon Plan and projection of Wall route including ‘depth barriers’ in West Bank</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 16</td>
<td>Israeli planning boundaries around Palestinian village of Al Funduq in the West Bank</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 17</td>
<td>Photographs from the Riwaq’s ‘Registry of Historic Buildings in Palestine’</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 18</td>
<td>Model demonstrating a series of possible spatial interventions in the Israeli settlement of P’sagot</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig. 19</td>
<td>Volunteers at ICAHD ‘Summer Rebuilding Camp’ in East Jerusalem</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Introduction: The Spatial Context
Fig. 3 – Map of de-jure and de-facto political divisions in Israel-Palestine, 2009 (Author)
Fig. 4 - Map of Jewish Settlements and Palestinian towns in the West Bank, 2002
“While acts of modern architecture were formulated throughout the Western world under the illusion of autonomy and structured in complex relationship between theory and practice, in Israel they were governed primarily by political circumstance and significance. Compared to the Western architecture that had the luxury of covering its political tracks under books and manifestos, in Israel it is impossible to ignore architecture’s simple, concrete truths.”

Sharon Rotbard

“It is ‘spaciocide,’ not urbicide. It is more holistic, incorporating ‘sociocide’ (targeting Palestinian society as a whole), ‘economocide’ (harming the movement of people and goods) and ‘politicide’ (destroying Palestinian National Authority (PNA) institutions, and other physical embodiments of national aspirations) … The Israeli agenda … has been to induce what one Israeli minister called ‘voluntary transfer,’ i.e. to get rid of the Palestinian population by transforming the Palestinian topos into atopia, by turning territory into mere land.”

Sari Hanafi

The present spatial reality of Israel-Palestine represents the ever-changing product of a multitude of agents and forces. The territory we see is comprised of two different ethno-national spaces – Israel and Palestine – superimposed on one another, neither entirely integrated nor entirely separate. Despite the prominence of its sporadic violent confrontations, for the most part the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a purely spatial one, played out in slow-motion through an Israeli-dominated instrumentalisation of the material and legislative tools of architecture and spatial planning. For Palestinians, the consequence of this spatial conflict is a process that Sari Hanafi describes as ‘spaciocide,’ the gradual destruction of their ‘national space’ in both a physical and socio-political sense.

On visiting the West Bank, one is at once confronted by the architectural artefacts of ‘occupation’; the hilltop settlements, the checkpoints, the watchtowers, the segregated road system, and above all the ‘Wall’9 (Fig. 2). Yet, despite its iconic status as a symbol of the Israeli occupation, the construction of the Wall, initiated in 2002,10 should not be understood as either an initiation or a culmination, but simply as the inauguration of the most visible device in a continually evolving process of spatial domination and reconfiguration that spans throughout the territory of Israel-Palestine, and which is not limited only to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). Fig. 4 is a map of the occupied West Bank charted by architect Eyal Weizman for Israeli human rights NGO B’Tselem in 2002. It demonstrates how, even prior to the construction of the wall, Israeli settlement practices had already achieved an almost complete domination of the territory.11

Taking a step back for a moment from the content of the Weizman map, it is somehow instructive that a human rights NGO should feel the need to engage in an act of cartography. It is a reflection of how little information was available in the public domain on the spatial reality of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the time of its publication; and consequently how decontextualised the conflict was in the eyes of a casual observer. The reflection of this same lack of territorial information in the mainstream US media was a phenomenon that Edward Said described as a “censorship of geography”. He argued that this lack of territorial context in “the most geographical of conflicts” allowed the nature of the conflict to be distorted, misrepresenting the balance of power and therefore the motivations of its actors, continuing: “The result is not just the preposterous belief that a Palestinian attack is under way on Israel, but a dehumanisation of Palestinians to the level of beasts virtually without sentience or motive.”

This cartographic intervention in the conflict offers a window into an arena defined here as ‘spatial resistance’ that is evolving across the territory of Israel-Palestine, where architects and spatial planning professionals are applying their professional skills and knowledge to work against the dominant structures of ‘spatial’ power. This publication is an attempt to document and learn from these practices, addressing the question of how architects and spatial planners – individuals from disciplines that have been so fundamental to the Israeli mechanisms of spatial domination – might most effectively employ their professional skills in resisting the tide of ‘spaciocide’ in Israel-Palestine.

Chapter 2 offers an attempt to contextualise ‘spaciocide’, and outlines the key legal, socio-economic, physical and psychological mechanisms of ‘spatial domination’ that have evolved in Israel-Palestine. Based on a number of interviews with individuals and organisations in Israel and the West Bank, Chapter 3 defines and explores a series of modes of ‘spatial resistance’; and in Chapter 4 these modes of resistance are critically evaluated in the strategic context of countering – challenging, undermining or subverting – the dominant spatial regime in Israel-Palestine.
Chapter 2
Mechanisms of Spatial Domination
Fig. 5 - Approximate distributions of Jewish and Palestinian populations in Israel-Palestine in 1945 (Author)
Fig. 6 - Approximate distributions of Jewish and Palestinian populations in Israel-Palestine in 2009 (Author)
In an environment where architecture and planning are systematically instrumentalized as the executive arms of the Israeli state, planning decisions do not often follow criteria of economic sustainability, ecology or efficiency of services, but are rather employed to serve strategic and political agendas. Space becomes the material embodiment of a matrix of forces, manifested across the landscape in the construction of roads, hilltop settlements, development towns and garden suburbs.13

Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman

In order to properly understand the structure of discrimination against the Arabs in Israel you have to understand the historical processes that produced and sustain it … When all is said and done, this is a state of the Jews and not their state; therefore, the discrimination that is practiced against them is structural, institutionalized. Israel is in a state of permanent denial vis-à-vis Palestinian identity and Palestinian history.14

Azmi Bishara

If the unfolding of the Zionist project15 is viewed in ethno-territorial terms, then ‘spaciocide’ should be understood as the prelude to its mode of colonization. To this day, there are Zionists that hold to the assertion that when the first European Jews arrived in the land of Palestine in the late 19th century, it was a land uninhabited, or at minimum a sparsely populated land without clear societal structures.16 Within this paradigm of colonization, played out in a land with an existing people and an existing society, then Hanafi’s notion of ‘spaciocide’ is the unspoken alter-ego of colonization as it manifests itself in the frontier territories; it is the obliteration of national space – the fragmentation of territory, identity and society – necessary to create the ‘tabula rasa’ of a ‘land uninhabited’.

The situation we see today is characterised by an elaborate composite of legalistic mechanisms, spatial practices and movement restrictions that are adapted to respond to the legal status of different territories and populations within Israel-Palestine; where agents act within and outside of political structures, within and outside of the law, to maintain the overarching processes of colonization. This is not to say that these combined practices represent a conspiracy – they are in fact the product of power structures and ideologies that are diffuse and divergent17 – but certainly their product from a Palestinian perspective is an unrelenting process of ‘spaciocide’; a process that has continued regardless of political peace negotiations.18

This chapter offers an attempt to outline the contemporary territorial and legislative context of Israel-Palestine; to introduce the key agents, processes and mechanisms involved in effecting ‘spaciocide’; and to suggest the key challenges that these present to those who would seek to resist them. The primary substance of this chapter is drawn from literary research; however, this is also supplemented in places by interview material.
and original syntheses of geographical information.

2.1 Territory and Identity

From the turn of the 19th century, Israel-Palestine saw the formation of two distinct ethno-national communities. The first was a Jewish community, led by Zionist Ashkenazi Jewish immigrants from Europe and Russia that essentially absorbed the native ‘Palestinian’ Jews and Jewish immigrants from the wider Arab world; the second was a Palestinian community formed from the remainder of the non-Jewish inhabitants of the territory. After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, despite the exodus of over 700,000 Palestinians, around 32,000 Palestinians remained in the territory that became the State of Israel. This war was followed by huge influxes of Jewish immigrants from Europe and the Arab world, and the various legal mechanisms and settlement practices developed to deal with the remaining Palestinians vis a vis this new population laid many of the principles of the subsequent colonization of the OPTs following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The internationally recognised territory of Israel is defined by the ‘Green Line’; the ceasefire lines agreed between the new State of Israel and surrounding Arab states in 1949, following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The population of Israel is approximately 80% Jewish and 20% Palestinian. The OPTs – the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip – are those territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Unlike in 1948, there was no mass-exodus of Palestinians in 1967; however, with the exception of those living in East Jerusalem (which Israel unilaterally annexed after 1967), Palestinians in the OPTs have not been offered Israeli citizenship and remain effectively stateless.

The Oslo Accords, a series of interim political agreements between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s, were supposed to pave the way for Palestinian autonomy through the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and a phased Israeli withdrawal from the OPTs. This withdrawal process broke down before Israel had evacuated any of its settlements, leading to the perpetuation of the territorial patchwork of administrative definitions seen in Weizman’s map of the West Bank (Fig. 4). Area A (18%) is under civil and security control of the PA; Area B (22%) is under civil control of the PA and military control of Israel; whilst Area C (60%) remains under full Israeli control. In 2005, Israel withdrew from its settlements and military installations in the Gaza strip, although it maintains full control of all borders, subterranean water resources and airspace. It is important to note that, despite this de facto reality, under international law there remain only two territorial definitions within Israel-Palestine – Israel and the OPTs (Fig. 3).

2.2 Institutional and Diffuse Power

Israel has a democratically elected and civilian audited government with an independent judiciary (the Israeli Supreme Court); however, there are also a number of non-governmental organisations that are integrated into the formulation and implementation of national planning and settlement policy. Many of these, including the Jewish Agency (JA), the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), existed prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, but were retained and re-structured to benefit the new state. Uri Davis explains how the presence of such organisations leads to a ‘veil of ambiguity’ that protects the government from accountability for discriminatory practices. The Israeli planning system itself has three tiers; national, regional and local (municipal), with committees at each of these levels controlling the various aspects of
Fig. 7 – Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices in Jerusalem region (Author)
Fig. 8 – Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices in southern ‘Triangle’ region (Author)
Fig. 9 – Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices around Nazareth, Israel (Author)
Fig. 10 – Map of settlement patterns and infrastructural devices around Ramallah, West Bank (Author)
Fig. 11 – Map of zoning in East Jerusalem by the Israeli ‘Jerusalem Municipality’
development within the country. Appointments to the national planning executive, which controls national development strategy, are made at a government level, meaning that the overall agenda is dominated by the prevailing Zionist politic. Municipal planning is led by community representatives, who also have the right to limited representation at a regional level. When development plans are deposited they must be made public, and the municipalities and residents that are affected have the right to mount legal objections within sixty days. In practice, however, plans are only published in specific journals and presented in a language accessible only to planning professionals, so there have been many instances of work starting on projects without the landowner’s prior knowledge.

The centrality of non-state actors to the state planning policy structures in Israel-Palestine can be illustrated by the JNF. The JNF is the largest private landowner in Israel, holding 13% of the land in Israel (including 40% of Palestinian ‘absentee’ land). Their land reserves, along with a further 80% of land in Israel defined as ‘state land’, are controlled by the Israel Lands Administration, where representatives of the JNF make up 10 of the 22 members of the policy executive. Yet, unlike the government itself, the JNF (in its own words) “is not a public body that works for the benefit of all citizens of the state. The loyalty of the JNF is given to the Jewish people and only to them is the JNF obligated. The JNF, as the owner of the JNF land, does not have a duty to practice equality towards all citizens of the state.”

Almost 70% of Israeli towns maintain ‘selection committees’ to scrutinize potential new residents. The role of these committees is officially to vet the compatibility of applicants with the existing composition of the community, using a system of profiling and interviews; in practice, this means that the vast majority of these communities do not accept Palestinians.

2.3 Legislative Mechanisms

Since 1948, a wide range of different legal mechanisms have been used to expropriate Palestinian land and constrain the growth of Palestinian areas, both within Israel and in the OPTs. The primary legal foundations for land expropriation have been the ‘absence’ of landowners, the requisition of land for ‘public purposes’, and the inventive application of various laws inherited from previous regimes in the territories. In addition to these, political agreements have also been used to change the de-facto status of land. This section offers a brief overview of the legal mechanisms for land expropriation, and how similar principles have been adapted to the different circumstances.
The ‘Absentee Property Law’ of 1950 and the subsequent ‘Land Acquisition Law’ of 1953 were implemented in order to confiscate the land of Palestinian refugees, and to transfer its ownership to the state of Israel. An ‘absentee’ was defined as anyone who had been absent from their land for even a single day from November 1947, and included internally displaced Palestinian-Israelis.46

Within Israel, the use of land for ‘public’ projects has been a major tool used to expropriate land, with legislation such as the ‘Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance.’47 Public projects mostly relate to national and regional infrastructure, but can also include government buildings. A prime example of this was seen in Nazareth, the largest Palestinian city in Israel, where 120 hectares of land directly adjacent to the built up area were expropriated for public use (Fig. 10). Although the site is home to government buildings, the majority of the land (91%) was used to found a new Jewish settlement called Nazareth Illit (Upper Nazareth).48

It is estimated that by the mid-1970s the Palestinian-Israelis across Israel had lost 65-75% of their land through the application of the various laws and ordinances for land expropriation.49 The failure of the Israeli planning
establishment to offer new sites to house the growing Palestinian population means that these communities rely on their remaining reserves of privately owned land to meet their development needs. As such, all state projects in and around these communities tend to be viewed as a ‘land grab’, even where they may offer some local benefit.50

In the OPTs, Israel has adopted a similar parlance of land expropriation for ‘public’ use; however, the legal mechanisms differ. The most common legalistic approach to acquiring land for settlements has been to utilise a law from the Ottoman period which had allowed the state to expropriate lands left uncultivated for 3 consecutive years, enabling Israel to seize large areas of occupied Palestinian land with a veil of legitimacy, particularly at higher altitudes where cultivation is impractical.51 This is part of the reason why Israeli settlements tend to occupy hilltop locations.52

In order to take land for military outposts and infrastructure projects serving the settlements, Israel relied on a provision in the Geneva Convention, allowing an occupying power to seize land temporarily under the pretext of ‘immediate security needs’.53 In fact, the language of ‘temporariness’ and Israel’s ‘security’ needs is one of the most often used arguments for justifying the ongoing occupation itself; and has become a legal tactic for impeding petitions and appeals in the Israeli courts.54

The transfer of expropriated land to non-governmental bodies has been a mechanism repeatedly used, both in Israel and the OPTs, to disperse the responsibility and the legal accountability for discriminatory development. It is estimated that around 40% of the JNF’s land reserves in Israel comprise of expropriated Palestinian refugee land,55 whilst the 2009 ‘Israel Land Reform Law’ will allow the transfer of Palestinian refugee land currently administered by the state to private ownership.56 In the OPTs it is common for expropriated Palestinian land to be transferred to private settler organisations for development, and there is even a recorded instance of the WZO acting as an ‘intermediary’ to transfer recognised private Palestinian land to settlers.57

Where land is not expropriated, a number of planning mechanisms may also be employed to limit the growth of Palestinian areas. The clearest examples of these are seen in East Jerusalem (Fig. 11), where the Municipality uses zoning to limit the built density of Palestinian areas, whilst private land around populated areas is designated as national park, open space or simply left ‘unzoned’.58 Even within Palestinian areas, permits are costly and usually take a number of years to obtain, which has led to so-called ‘illegal’ building and the growing Israeli practice of house demolitions59 (Fig. 12). Such discriminatory planning practices are not limited to East Jerusalem only, with similar cases seen throughout Israel60 and mirrored in Area C of the West Bank.61 Jeff Halper of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) sees house demolitions as representing “the essence of the conflict”, explaining: “if you deny someone a home on an individual basis – human beings can’t function without homes – it gives a message, and if you then do it on a collective basis – which Israel has been doing since 1948 – then the message is ‘get out’ as a people.”62

The Oslo Accords during the 1990s allowed Israel to add a veil of political legitimacy to their de-facto control of the majority of the land in the OPTs. In addition to control of the land itself, the agreements also handed Israel effective control of the airspace above and the water resources below. This is a situation that that Weizman describes as the “politics of verticality”; referring to the fact that the territory was not only divided on the ground, but also in a 3rd dimension.63
2.4 Spatial Fragmentation and Enclavisation

Although legislative mechanisms can constrain the physical growth of Palestinian localities, it is the application of spatial planning principles at a local, regional and national scale to build a continuous Jewish presence throughout the territory that have been most fundamental in the fragmentation of the Palestinian national space. Three key principles have been fundamental to this; firstly, the building of new Jewish communities throughout the territories (the architecture of ‘presence’); secondly, the planning of military outposts and Jewish communities to visually dominate the landscape (the architecture of ‘observation’); and thirdly, the use of physical obstacles and spatial practices to impede access and movement (the architecture of ‘control’). This section briefly discusses how these principles have been applied and how they have, in turn, led to a pattern of densely populated Palestinian enclaves.

The architecture of ‘presence’ is perhaps best illustrated by the ‘Sharon Plan’ (1949); the first official masterplan of the State of Israel, prepared in just one year by a team...
led by Bauhaus-trained architect Arieh Sharon. The plan offered a blueprint for the development of the entire state at a scale of 1:20,000. Zvi Erfat describes the Sharon Plan as a “mega-project embracing dozens of cities and towns and hundreds of rural settlements ... woodlands, national parks ... networks of roads, electricity, water, ports and factories.” Crucially, the plan strategically dispersed new Jewish immigrants throughout the length and breadth of Israel, using a civilian presence to ‘shore up’ the territory and borders of the new state, filling the void of absence left by the Palestinian refugees.

The clearest use of the architecture of ‘control’ is in the OPTs, with barriers and checkpoints (Fig. 13) used to physically restrict movement both within the territory and to areas outside of it. The areas which individuals can access are determined by their ID card and various special permits (Fig. 14). It is suggested that the checkpoints also act as a form of ‘psychological’ control; that by operating the system of checkpoints in an erratic and seemingly haphazard way, the fear of delay, detention or being turned back at checkpoints has led the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank to abandon non-essential travel even within the territory.

The architecture of ‘control’ is also seen in the strategic...
use of seemingly mundane infrastructural devices to limit access to land and to constrain the expansion of Palestinian areas. Again, the clearest use of these devices is seen in the OPTs; a network of roads has been built to join settlements together whilst simultaneously separating adjacent Palestinian towns and villages. However, there are also many examples of situations where bypass roads have been used within Israel to exactly the same effect. Road 6 (the ‘Trans-Israel Highway’) is a major new north-south highway that runs right along the western side of the Green Line and directly through the ‘Triangle’ and the northern Negev, both areas with significant Palestinian populations. In addition to large sections being built on Palestinian-owned land (particularly in the ‘Triangle’), initial plans failed to offer crossings for Palestinians to access farmland and ran directly through Bedouin villages, whilst few of the junctions actually serve Palestinian areas directly (Fig. 8). It is additionally argued that Road 6 is intended to shift the ‘spine’ of Israel eastwards, to aid the ‘normalisation’ of West Bank settlements as a part of Israel.

The clearest example of the architecture of ‘observation’ is in the hilltop settlements of the West Bank. The internal planning of the settlements is in concentric circles, with each dwelling having an aspect that observes the surrounding landscape. On a territorial scale, the settlements form a visually interconnected matrix of observation, a “large scale network of ‘civilian fortifications’, generating tactical surveillance in the state’s regional defence plan”. As objects, the settlements themselves are also very visible in the landscape, and dominate the horizon of most Palestinian urban areas, making the function of observation an overt one such that Palestinians ‘feel’ watched.

In reality, the majority of the interventions of spatial fragmentation in Israel and the OPTs in fact represent a composite of the three principles outlined here; indeed achieving ‘control’ is often dependent on ‘observation’; and the practice of both of these principles will tend to rely on some form of ‘presence’ (although often military rather than civilian). East Jerusalem represents a microcosm where all of these principles come together in a single confined physical space (Fig. 7). The architecture of ‘presence’ is seen in the Jewish settlements peppered between Palestinian neighbourhoods and around the periphery of the city. These peripheral settlements act in conjunction with the Wall to physically separate Palestinian East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, to control access to the city, and to visually dominate and observe the Palestinian lands beyond.

In the West Bank, the relative ease with which Palestinians can build in Areas A and B has led to rapid development focusing on the major cities, in particular Ramallah where the PA administration is based. The lack of a strong planning system in these areas has led to concerns that their architectural heritage and character is being compromised, whilst the focus of investment towards these urban areas has contributed to ‘de-development’ and a consequent population flight from the rural villages of Area C. It could be argued that the combination of these factors points towards the ‘hardening’ of the temporary political boundaries of the Oslo era, and the increasing ‘enclavisation’ of the Palestinian national space (Fig. 10).

2.5 The Politics of Separation

There is another factor that adds a final complex layer to the process of ‘spaciocide’. If the ultimate goal of the politics and practices of Israeli spatial domination is understood as the desire to ensure a Jewish exclusivity in as much of Israel-Palestine as possible, the large Palestinian population effectively absorbed by Israel in 1967 presents an ongoing ‘demographic threat’ to
this Jewish dominance of the territory. In 2005 it was estimated that the Jewish and Palestinian populations reached parity in Israel-Palestine, whilst the higher fertility-rate in Palestinian communities is slowly leading to a Palestinian majority.83

The ‘demographic threat’ was understood early on by Israeli politicians; with the Allon Plan (1967-77) proposing to hand over the most densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank to Jordanian control, whilst annexing Jerusalem and the sparsely populated regions including the Jordan valley84 (Fig. 15). However, the facts being built on the ground by settler organisations, and
then cemented by the right-wing Likud government (from 1977) and all later governments,\textsuperscript{85} have made such linear divisions of territory all but impossible. Weizman describes how all subsequent plans have required increasing numbers of extra-territorial infrastructural devices to link both the Palestinian and Israeli enclaves that would be formed, dividing the territory in 3-dimensions; a condition that he describes as the “impossible politics of separation”,\textsuperscript{86} which brings a whole new meaning to the notion of ‘building bridges between communities’.

The contemporary principles of separation, the Israeli approach to the parameters of a ‘two-state’ solution, were perhaps most succinctly expressed through the notion of ‘Hitkansut’ (Hebrew ‘ingathering’ or ‘convergence’) proposed by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (Fig. 14). Olmert had made clear his fear of the ‘demographic threat’, in particular a fear of a Palestinian demand for voting rights in the OPTs,\textsuperscript{57} and proposed a policy of ‘unilateral’ separation that would annex a maximal amount of land with a minimal number of Palestinians. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe elaborates: “This explains the 670-km long serpentine route of the 8m-high concrete slabs, barbed wire and manned watchtowers that make up the Wall, and why it runs more than twice the length of the 315 km long ‘Green Line’.”\textsuperscript{88}

Despite the seeming impossibility of creating two coherent and spatially viable states in Israel-Palestine, to date the PLO have also chosen to pursue a ‘two-state’ solution based on the return of Israel to the pre-1967 border of the Green Line, creating a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On 15th November 2009, the PLO announced their own ‘unilateral’ strategy of achieving this goal by seeking the recognition of the UN Security Council for an independent Palestinian state within these borders.\textsuperscript{89}

\section{2.6 Summary}

In this chapter we have seen how a multitude mechanisms of Israeli spatial domination, established and employed through diffuse – formal and informal – power structures, are resulting in an ongoing process ‘spaciocide’; the fragmentation of the Palestinian national space. In addition, we have seen how, since 1967, the entire territory of Israel-Palestine resides under de-facto Israeli control, and how closely the settlement practices in the OPTs are reflected by discriminatory practices against Palestinian citizens within Israel; all either perpetrated, supported or tolerated by this single executive power. This de-facto situation has been set against the fact that, under international law, Israel has no legitimate jurisdiction in the OPTs other than its obligations as an occupying power under the Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{90}

Understanding these factors – the mechanisms and actors of spatial domination, the de-facto structures of power, and their varying legitimacy under international law depending on the territory (Israel or the OPTs) – should be seen as a fundamental element of formulating effective strategies of spatial resistance. Chapter 3 offers definitions of the key modes of spatial resistance and how these are currently being practiced in Israel-Palestine. Chapter 4, the final conclusion, brings the factors outlined above back into sharper focus, offering a more strategic overview of the prevalent modes of resistance.
Chapter 3
Modes of Spatial Resistance
“It is an awareness of this relationship between individual action and the bigger picture; the issue of scale; of knowingly exploiting and working with cause and effect; of a knowledge of the ‘system’ and how to intervene, transgress and exploit it to one’s advantage; and of realising the power and transformative potential of connections, between subjects, disciplines and people, that is the key to … understanding of the term ‘agency’.”

Florian Kossak et al.

Based on the interviews conducted with a series of individuals and organisations in Israel and the West Bank, each working broadly within the fields of architecture and spatial planning, this chapter documents a series of practices that could be seen to run counter to the prevailing paradigm of ‘spaciocide’. As such, ‘spatial resistance’ is understood here as a particular form of ‘agency’, in the sense outlined by Kossak et al., making use of “a knowledge of the ‘system’ and how to intervene”. Five overarching categories are defined within which these modes of ‘spatial resistance’ are presented. In some places interview material is supplemented with summaries, quotations and graphics from related literature and other organisations working within similar fields.

3.1 Spatial Analysis

The first category of spatial resistance relates to what might be called the ‘unmasking’ of the spatial reality of the conflict and of the mechanisms of spatial domination. The specific skills of the architect are valuable both in terms of spatial analysis – interrogating maps, aerial photographs, planning documents and legal documents, and the undertaking of empirical surveys – and in synthesizing and communicating this research in a graphically clear and accessible format.

A number of the sources that have been referred to in the previous chapter are examples of this form of analysis. In particular, the publications ‘A Civilian Occupation’ and ‘City of Collision’ are instances of a range of academics, spatial planning professionals and cultural/political commentators bringing together their combined expertise to challenge conventional perceptions of the spatial reality of Israel-Palestine and the key forces that drive its transformation.
A large number of NGOs in Israel and the OPTs are involved in monitoring various aspects of Israel’s occupation. Those that monitor ‘spatial’ aspects include UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), B’Tselem, Peace Now and ARIJ (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem). Of the organisations interviewed for this research, Bimkom (Planners for Planning Rights) and the Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP) in Israel, and Riwaq (The Center for Architectural Conservation) in the West Bank have had the clearest involvement in ‘spatial analysis’.

The advocacy work of Bimkom for the planning rights of vulnerable minority groups in Israel since 1999 has required, by necessity, an understanding of the planning system and extensive research into legal precedents and local and regional planning documents. Since 2005, Bimkom have been distilling relevant information from their research into reports for public consumption. These reports have included: ‘The Planning Deadlock’ (an analysis of the discriminatory planning situation faced by Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem); ‘Under the Guise of Security’ (an analysis demonstrating that
the primary factor influencing much of the route of the Wall had been the provision of expansion land for Israeli settlements in the OPTs); and ‘The Prohibited Zone’ (a detailed investigation into the effective prohibition of any Palestinian development in Area C of the West Bank, Fig. 16). These documents offer a valuable resource to Palestinians in the OPTs who are forced to deal with Israeli planning authorities and for those organisations involved in political advocacy for Palestinian rights who require reliable and verifiable information on the occupation.

ACAP have made use of GIS (Geographical Information System) software to build an interactive database mapping Palestinian land ownership and key demographic data in Israel. In addition to using the system internally to aid their day-to-day work, ACAP are starting to make the system available for the use of Palestinian municipalities in Israel, and are considering offering open access to the public. In relation to their GIS work, ACAP are currently discussing possible future collaborative projects with ARIJ (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem) on the mapping of historical landownership across Israel-Palestine, and with Adalah...
(The Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), to analyse the impact of the 2009 'Israel Land Reform Law' on Palestinian land rights.

A central element of Riwaq’s work has been in the compilation of the ‘Registry of Historic Buildings in Palestine’ (Fig. 17), the first comprehensive documentation of the historic architecture of the OPTs containing photographs, maps and other architectural information on 50,320 historic buildings across 422 Palestinian localities. The aim of the register was to be a first step towards safeguarding the rich architectural heritage of the OPTs that has been so neglected under the cloud of a prolonged conflict; and it has also formed a key foundation for Riwaq’s work in regenerating the historic cores of a number of Palestinian villages.

3.2 Professional Advocacy

The second category of spatial resistance is the application of professional skills in the realm of advocacy. This might involve offering expert opinions to support court petitions and planning objections, or preparing counter-plans – either reactively or proactively – to offer viable alternatives where statutory plans are seen to be discriminatory.

Professional advocacy forms the core of the work of both ACAP and Bimkom. There are essentially three forms of professional advocacy that these organisations are involved in: raising planning objections; aiding proactive community-driven planning; and preparing counter-plans. Since ACAP is a Palestinian-Israeli organisation and Bimkom is primarily Jewish-Israeli, they actually collaborate directly on a number of projects and sometimes receive joint funding. This appears to be mutually beneficial Bimkom’s access to the planning system is less hindered, whilst ACAP find it easier to engage with Palestinian communities.

To aid planning objections, ACAP maintain a ‘watchdog’ function, monitoring the various journals where planning proposals are published for plans that infringe upon Palestinian land or discriminate against Palestinian residents. As a part of this function, they support local authorities in mounting legal objections to discriminatory plans. In 2004, ACAP became the first Israeli NGO to be given the right to raise ‘proxy’ planning objections on behalf of others; however, they still make an effort to work with municipalities where possible.

Bimkom are similarly involved in raising planning objections, but have also lent their professional weight to legal objections by various NGOs against the Wall and its specific route within the West Bank. Karen Pacht notes one key occasion in the courts when Bimkom’s planners presented a polystyrene contour model demonstrating the effects of the Wall’s route, an intervention which was crucial in a series of precedent-setting cases for its rerouting.

Both ACAP and Bimkom are involved in work to empower local communities. ACAP offer seminars to local authority officials to explain the workings of the Israeli planning system. The aim of these courses is to enable these local officials to engage more confidently with the Israeli planning system, and also to work more proactively on behalf of their localities at a regional planning level. Both Bimkom and ACAP facilitate workshops with local communities to develop agreed planning principles and to help them to engage with the planning authorities. A key aim of this advocacy work has been the recognition and formal planning of a number of previously unrecognised Bedouin villages in the Negev region.

Another form of professional advocacy that ACAP in particular have been involved in is the development
of counter-plans. Particularly in the case of national or regional infrastructure projects, it is likely that the projects will go ahead in one form or another in spite of planning objections. Here, the possibility of offering a counter-plan is essentially seen as a means to limit the negative impacts of a project, and the professional status of ACAP’s planners is fundamental to making such counter-proposals possible.106

Both Bimkom and ACAP generally avoid detailed planning work, citing the high demand on resources and the fact that this ought to be the work of government bodies or developers.107 Bimkom’s only experience of detailed planning – in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Isawiya from 2004 – is instructive of the challenges faced by Palestinians. In particular, various agents – including the municipal government, the national parks agency and a national government minister – attempted to restrict the land zoned for expansion of the neighbourhood; and even the ‘final’ agreed plan with a reduced expansion area remained subject to alteration.108

3.3 Political Advocacy

The third category of spatial resistance, in a similar manner to the second, involves lending the weight of professional expert opinion. The clear difference is that political advocacy, unlike ‘pure’ professional advocacy, tends to require the staking of some form of political position and/or seeking the intervention of forces outside of the normal legislative framework.

Here, it is important to outline the potential forces that political advocacy can be directed towards; although the primary aim of the advocacy outlined here is to affect change in Israeli government policy and legislation, the method of achieving such movement is through eliciting pressure from elsewhere; generally through the mobilisation of foreign governments and international civil society.

Of the organisations interviewed, Bimkom and ICAHD (Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions) are most actively involved in political advocacy. Bimkom have been involved with various awareness campaigns aimed towards foreign diplomats in Israel, and in various activities in coalition with other human rights groups; whilst ICAHD’s primary focus is on engaging with international civil society. In the OPTs, Riwaq have been involved in work to directly lobby the PA.

Bimkom are an organisation without a particular political affiliation; they do not accept government funding109 and focus their advocacy on ‘planning rights’, what they describe as “human rights in the field of spatial planning”.110 However, where they have seen a conflict between Israeli actions and international humanitarian law, they have been involved with coalitions with other NGOs to speak out against government actions.111

Almost uniquely among the organisations interviewed, ICAHD are very upfront about their political position. Jeff Halper says that they see the demolition of Palestinian homes as a microcosm of the conflict – in particular the territorial/demographic ambitions of Israel and the human suffering among Palestinians – and as a vehicle for communicating the injustice of the Israeli occupation to an international audience in a hope to create a political climate that will bring about change locally. He explains: “We use house demolitions, we use our projects as a vehicle for a bigger political agenda. We see ourselves as actors, not just as a protest group.”112 In addition to their direct action work (described in 4.5), ICAHD have a major focus on networking activities with international civil society groups; in addition to soliciting support for their work on the ground, Halper explains that he also sees ICAHD’s
role as helping to offer direction and focus to these international groups. To this end, rather than carrying out their own research, ICAHD draw on the wealth of information gathered by other organisations to compile dossiers on the current situation, outlining in particular what they describe as the “Obstacles to Peace”.

Farhat Muhawi speaks about Riwaq’s aim of “being political by being apolitical”. This could be understood as a principle of working on projects of shared national interest and consensus, whilst avoiding association with the divisive party politics of the PA. Riwaq have brought forward legislation within the ministries of the PA to protect the architectural heritage of the OPTs. Previously, legislation only offered protection for buildings built before 1700, which are defined as ‘antiquities’. The new legislation is seen as an effective way to draw attention to remote villages that have been neglected under an extended period of de-facto Israeli control, and that represent the areas most threatened by Israeli settlement expansion; effectively calling for a shift in the focus of national development away from the urban enclaves of Area A, and towards Areas B and C.

3.4 Critical Speculation

The fourth category of spatial resistance involves employing the design skills of the architect. In the broadest sense, ‘critical speculation’ should be seen as the creative application of detailed knowledge of the spatial fault-lines of the conflict to create an “arena of speculation”. As an example, the act of design – ‘paper architecture’ – allows the selective adherence to and subversion of the political and legal constraints of the current spatial regime, either to offer future plans (provocative, aspirational or eminently realisable), alternative visions of the present, or simply as a means to extrapolate the logic of the dominant forces to their ultimate spatial conclusion.

Of the organisations interviewed, Decolonizing Architecture (DA), Birzeit University and Riwaq, all based in the West Bank, are most clearly involved in forms critical speculation. Their work includes investigations into the reuse of the architecture of the Israeli occupation, regional spatial planning, and the development of new approaches to the teaching of architecture and spatial planning.

The work of the DA studio has focused predominantly on the potential for the reuse and subversion of Israeli settlements, military bases and other elements of Israel’s colonial architecture in the OPTs. Their work is conceived through engagement with local communities and is presented to both a local and international audience via biennale exhibitions, written publications, lectures and the web. Alessandro Petti, the director of DA, explains that the project was born out of a frustration shared with fellow academics and collaborators Eyal Weizman and Sandi Hilal, that their previous work in architectural research was only able to respond in a reactive way to each new policy, strategy or restriction applied by Israel. Petti elaborates: “This is where DA was conceived; trying to establish an independent political agenda; one linked to the reality, but located within a broader sense of history; not the history of today and yesterday only; but located within the decades that mark the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

In their first major project – the re-planning of the settlement of P’sagot, near Ramallah (Fig. 18) – rather than designing a single plan, DA adopted the approach of using the site as a vehicle to investigate a wide range of approaches to reuse and re-appropriation. Petti explains that they saw this as an effective way to stimulate debate, and to avoid the risk of their designs being seen as concrete ‘solutions’, in a way that might in fact constrain further speculation by others.
In parallel to their initial project work, DA also collaborated with Birzeit, where architecture students would use the same project sites to develop their own design work. Following this collaboration, Birzeit began a more formal integration of the ideas of critical speculation into their curriculum, and as a part of a new course in urban planning. Yazid Anani explains how the unique challenge of planning under occupation has led Birzeit to experiment with different approaches to the teaching of spatial planning as a discipline: “we’re trying with the students also to question whether planning should be used for dealing with the current situation, or whether planning should be a tool of opposition, and changing the power structure of the whole Israeli negotiations … Personally, I think this is the way things change; producing arguments, and flipping the power structure of negotiations towards the Palestinian side; so it’s not dealing with the restrictions of Area A, B and C; it’s using that kind of structure and trying to revolt against it, or subvert it.”
Petti explains how he feels that DA’s body of work to date may represent a temporary conclusion of the project in its current form. He has begun to work with Al-Quds University in Jerusalem to develop a course drawing on the themes and approaches to critical speculation through design explored by the DA project, and has been in discussions with Bethlehem Museum with a view to putting DA’s exhibitions on permanent display.\(^\text{122}\)

In 2009, Riwaq initiated the ‘50 Villages’ project. The basic principle of 50 Villages is to initiate preventive conservation and redevelopment of the 50 most historically significant village cores in the OPTs, ensuring the preservation of more than half of the most notable historic buildings in the territories. Although significant conservation work has already been undertaken with pilot projects in two villages,\(^\text{123}\) at this stage 50 Villages is best understood as a critical speculation project aimed at generating debate and engagement with the idea of a coherent nation plan for the spatial development of ‘Palestine’. Muhawi explains: “We see the 50 villages as a national cultural project. Using this potential, and working with communities there as a project that connects these sites which are currently divided by settlements and bypass roads. We are trying to offer [the PA] a national cultural project that is based on using these potentials of heritage to make these connections.”\(^\text{124}\)

A crucial component of the launch of the project was the 2009 Riwaq Biennale, which invited interested parties – local and international – to engage in a series of tours, cultural events and workshops in each of the villages. Muhawi also describes a parallel initiative called “Think-Net” that aims to draw on the expertise and experience of a wide array of individuals to shape the direction of their work and to build the profile and momentum of the project.\(^\text{125}\) Anani, who also worked as a consultant with Riwaq on the 50 Villages project, explains how, even as an architect and urban planner, the movement restrictions imposed by Israel had constricted his awareness of the geography of Palestine, and how the opportunity to visit a number of the villages had transformed his perceptions of his own national landscape: “The whole landscape; these villages that I’d never been to and never knew existed; I was shocked. At one point I was about to cry; there was a small hill, and there was a sort of military base that was evacuated by the Israelis; and the Director of Riwaq and I were standing up there, and there were plains and agricultural fields all over; it was beautiful, sensational, with the light, it was amazing; for me this is rediscovering Palestine.”\(^\text{126}\)

There is evidence that the PA itself has started to adopt elements of critical speculation in its new approach towards achieving Palestinian statehood. Although much of its ‘Two-Year Plan for Palestinian Statehood’\(^\text{127}\) is focused on familiar formulas of institution building within the constraints of Israeli occupation, there are certain breaks with the tradition of waiting for Israel to make the first move, including speculative plans for major infrastructural development and an airport in the Jordan Valley; projects that would require significant spatial interventions in Area C of the West Bank. Judeh Jamal, who was employed as a consultant by the PA Ministry of Planning, working with Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, explains: “I think it’s a new example of a proactive rather than reactive approach … we are proposing something realistic, something clear, people understand it … We have to concentrate on not doing what Israelis want us to do, but to keep focused on ending the occupation.” Petti suggests that, in addition to this plan, the PA have also followed the lead of DA by starting to focus in detail on the question of how to re-plan Israeli settlements and integrate them into the Palestinian urban fabric.\(^\text{129}\)
3.5 Physical Intervention

The fifth and final category of spatial resistance identified here is for the architect to employ the physical act of building – the concrete ‘fact on the ground’ – as a means to disrupt the dominant structures of the spatial conflict. This may include acts of defiance that directly reject the de-facto balance of political power, or spatial interventions realised within the existing political frameworks that point towards an alternative spatial future.

Although in very different ways, ICAHD and Riwaq are both utilise physical intervention as a mode for countering the effects of Israeli spatial policy in the OPTs. ICAHD take the approach of confronting the occupation very directly, whilst Riwaq utilise spatial intervention as a vehicle to support socio-political empowerment.

This form of resistance is most clearly evident in East Jerusalem, where severe Israeli restrictions on the development of Palestinian areas have led thousands of residents to resort to building without permits. Unlike a number of other NGOs, rather than fighting demolition orders in the courts, ICAHD has taken a direct action approach to their work in the OPTs – and particularly in East Jerusalem – mobilising protests to obstruct demolitions, and organising groups of volunteers to
rebuild demolished homes. Halper argues that since Israeli sovereignty over the OPTs is not recognised under international law, their legislative system has no legitimacy in these areas, and that cooperation with the mechanisms of this system simply acts to reinforce its power: “When we build, we don’t ask for permits … The whole point we’re making is that we’re building in conformity with international law, because people have rights to housing. But it’s in violation of Israeli law, because it’s Israeli law that says they need permits. It would be ridiculous for us to go and get a building permit for people, and then say that we’re resisting anything.” And it seems that the gravitas of this approach is growing; in 2008 and 2009, the Spanish government were among ICAHD’s financial supporters, paying for the reconstruction of two demolished homes, and for the flights of the Spanish volunteers who rebuilt them.  

Architectural conservation may seem an improbable instrument of physical intervention in a contemporary spatial conflict, but Riwaq have begun to demonstrate its potential in fighting the fragmentation of the Palestinian national space, in particular the flight from rural areas since the 1990s. Muhawi explains that, through the 50 Villages project, Riwaq “are attempting to use the rehabilitation process in these historic centres as a tool for development of the local economy”. Muhawi adds that the first pilot project for 50 Villages, rehabilitating the historic core of Birzeit village, not only succeeded in generating an empowerment of existing residents, but also attracted a number of residents back to the village and led to an economic rejuvenation of the commercial strip in the village. Such projects seem to offer a path towards reinforcing the Palestinian presence in rural areas, and to start rejoining the dots of the fragmented Palestinian national space.

3.6 Summary

In this chapter we have seen an overview of the activities of a wide range of organisations, representing a cross-section of the ways in which architectural techniques and practices are being employed as modes of resistance in Israel-Palestine. These range from research to design, and from advocacy to direct action. We have also seen evidence of coordinated activities that encompass a range of disciplines – lawyers, academics, political activists etc. – cross the lines of communities and also reach out to international actors. The final concluding chapter will discuss what might be understood as the overarching strategies – displayed implicitly or explicitly in the work of these organisations – for combating the mechanisms of Israeli spatial domination; and the ways in which the development of these strategies might lead to mechanisms for reversing the process of ‘spaciocide’ in Israel-Palestine.
Chapter 4

Conclusion: Reframing the Spatial Struggle
“Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of [architectural] projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because ‘liberty’ is what must be exercised.”

Michel Foucault

It is important to note that spatial resistance is not an act that takes place in isolation from an overarching socio-political struggle. The ‘spatial struggle’ should therefore be seen as something that both feeds from and reinforces other elements of a wider movement. Foucault’s caution that architecture, or spatial intervention, cannot in itself create liberty is particularly relevant, since its connotations appear reversible. Whilst it underlines the fact that spatial resistance can only be successful as a part of this wider social resistance, it also implies that the physical and socio-political structures seen to deny liberty are capable also of being “turned around” by a social transformation.

The modes of spatial resistance seen in the previous chapter offer an indication of the potential routes through which architects and spatial planning professionals can contribute in a meaningful way to hemming back the tide of spaciocide in Israel-Palestine. However, there is perhaps only limited evidence of cases where this tide has been effectively ‘reversed’. This final chapter offers an attempt to reframe the modes of spatial resistance outlined in the previous chapter in a manner that responds to the context of the wider socio-political struggle and the suggestion of Kossak et al that effective ‘agency’ must show an “awareness of [the] relationship between individual action and the bigger picture … a knowledge of the ‘system’ and how to intervene, transgress and exploit it to one’s advantage.”

The ‘bigger picture’ of Israel-Palestine – as illustrated in Chapter 2 – suggests that, whilst spaciocide can be seen as single paradigm across the territory occurring under a single executive power, the applicable legal/political framework for resistance differs fundamentally between Israel and the OPTs. Much in the same way that the agents of ‘spatial domination’ act both within and outside of the established structures of power; agents of ‘spatial resistance’ must respond selectively and
inventively to these structures, whilst also differentiating between short-term and long-term goals. In this chapter, three different overarching strategies for resistance are suggested – ‘working within the system’, ‘working outside of the system’, and ‘planning an alternative future’ – rather than conflicting with one another, it is suggested that these strategies can inform and even coincide with one another.

4.1 Working within the System

Within Israel, where the Israeli legislative system has legitimacy under international law, it is necessary that resistance takes place within this system. It is ‘spatial analysis’ and ‘professional advocacy’ that are the key to this approach; with ‘political advocacy’ also a relevant tool to turn to. The work of Bimkom and ACAP in particular suggests that there is a certain amount of potential for Palestinian-Israelis, as citizens, to fight discrimination in the courts, and to use existing laws to fight for more egalitarian planning policies.

Both ACAP and Bimkom underline that the status of their staff as planning professionals has been fundamental to their successes in fighting discrimination and making the Israeli planning process more transparent. A landmark achievement to date has been the official recognition of ACAP as a body that can make planning objections on behalf of Palestinian individuals and municipalities in Israel, making it easier to safeguard the planning rights of Palestinian-Israelis.

Setting legal precedents in the Israeli courts is an important tool for bringing about positive changes to the discriminatory practices of the various pseudo-governmental organisations, such as the JNF and the regional ‘selection committees’ that are involved in discriminatory planning and development practices. Adalah, an organisation that already works with ACAP (as noted), takes many cases to the courts, and the continued ‘spatial analysis’ work of ACAP and other individuals and organisations undoubtedly lends increased weight to these cases.

Another area of potential is that of ‘empowerment’ and ‘mobilisation’. The work of both Adalah and Bimkom to educate communities and municipal authorities about their planning rights and about how to work with the Israeli planning system is fundamental to this. In the longer term, the move from reactive to proactive planning already signalled by ACAP, and the potential for Palestinian-Israeli municipalities to work together at a regional and national level, points towards the possibility to push for much greater focus on the needs of Palestinian-Israelis in regional and national planning policy. In this vein Dr Hanna Sweid, co-founder of ACAP and now an elected member of the Israeli parliament, is already pushing for the planning of new Palestinian-Israeli towns at a political level.\(^\text{138}\)

It should be noted that there are instances where external pressure might be sought through ‘political advocacy’, even when working within the ‘system’. In the cases where there is evidence that due process is not being followed by the Israeli planning authorities, where legal precedents are being ignored or, most significantly, where there is evidence that fundamental planning rights are being denied.

Within Areas A and B of the West Bank, where the PA has a certain level of control over planning, the primary challenge in the current situation is to meet the planning needs of communities whilst working to safeguard cultural identity and to mitigate the ‘enclavisation’ of Palestinian areas. The work of Riwaq, pushing for legislation to protect historic buildings and empowering communities – building socio-economic opportunities
through the rehabilitation of historic quarters – offers a creative route forward. Working against ‘enclavisation’ is perhaps something that depends on a longer term planning approach at an ‘institutional’ level, requiring the PA to link local planning policy to regional and national scale thinking.\textsuperscript{139}

4.2 Working Outside of the System

In the OPTs, where Israeli authority is not recognised internationally, Halper in particular makes a strong case that appealing to the power structures of the occupation – the Israeli administration and court system – simply increases their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{140} The argument is that the approval of one building permit legitimises the destruction of all ‘illegally’ built structures; the same is true where the ‘precedent’ set in the courts in a decision to re-route the Wall also acts as a legal endorsement of the Wall itself.\textsuperscript{141}

The fundamental tools of working outside of the system are ‘physical intervention’ and ‘political advocacy’; using physical intervention as a means to interrupt the status quo, and political advocacy to blunt the instruments of the occupation. There are perhaps two overriding strategies for working outside of the system. One is a centralised approach, where regional and national masterplans are formulated, and facts are built on the ground strategically in accordance with these. In essence, a new ‘Palestinian’ system is slowly built on top of the geography currently dictated by the Oslo Accords. The other possibility is a decentralised approach, where a multitude of local agents operate in coordination so as to create an unmanageable chaos of spatial interventions on the ground.

A centralised approach would require a strong ‘institutional’ power with an ability to organise a mobilisation on a national scale, and to act independently from the structures of the occupation. Although the PA’s recent rhetoric of ‘unilateral’ action points towards this kind of approach, the PA as an organisation is born out of the Oslo Accords and is as such rooted within the structure of the Israeli occupation, making it difficult to envisage how such a fundamental change of direction could be realised on the ground.

At this point in time, many of the structures exist to mobilise at a local level, and to informally coordinate such actions. A huge number of NGOs operate across the territory and have demonstrated an ability to coordinate nationally and internationally in initiatives such as the Palestinian NGO Network\textsuperscript{142} and the Global BDS Movement\textsuperscript{143} whilst many municipal governments have a significant level of autonomy from the PA. The work of ICAHD in particular has demonstrated the possibility to mobilise local and international support to rebuild homes that Israel deems to be ‘illegal’. The extrapolation of the macro-scale logic of ‘illegal’ building in Jerusalem – where the rate of Israeli demolitions appears unable to match the rate of Palestinian construction in many neighbourhoods\textsuperscript{144} – to Area C of the West Bank, for the building of homes, public services, recreation facilities and even local infrastructure, is one possible application for the tactic of ‘decentralised’ spatial intervention.

A decentralised approach could in fact be seen as a tactical advantage, since the lack of a central ‘masterplan’ would reduce the ability of the Israeli authorities to counter-plan and undermine the realisation of spatial interventions. Anani describes this kind of situation: “I think this is a really interesting way of resisting the kind of indirect and decentralised forces that manipulate planning; building these kind of moments of resistance that are also decentralised. No planning entity or official entity can really
see it ahead of time and fight it; so decentralised that you cannot really deal with it anymore."  

Fundamental to both of these approaches is an active ‘political advocacy’. Since Israel always has the option of deploying overwhelming force to undermine any kind of spatial intervention on the ground, it is essential that external sources of pressure are also mobilised in support of such actions. A heightened awareness of the situation in East Jerusalem through media coverage, and the ongoing pressure of Palestinian leaders and international civil society groups have led to statements from a number of international political leaders against evictions and house demolitions in Palestinian neighbourhoods. The active support of the Spanish government for ICAHD’s house rebuilding programme in East Jerusalem in fact already goes a step further. If foreign governments could be pressured to act decisively and extrapolate this same logic across the whole of the OPTs, particularly in Area C, then it could provide a valuable diplomatic cover for many possible forms and sites of ‘physical intervention’.

Perhaps a greater challenge to such strategies of ‘physical intervention’ – either centralised or decentralised – is the likelihood that radical settler groups would simply increase the intensity and severity of their own actions to compensate for this more tangible counter-action. Arguably, this kind of situation might simply force the Israeli authorities to show their ‘true’ face to the international community by making a clear choice between support for Palestinian rights and support for Israeli settlement expansion.

4.3 Planning an Alternative Future

“When we presented the projects at the beginning, many people were smiling, and this smile we couldn’t understand to begin with. But then we realised that this was the moment where they realised the possibility of imagining different futures.”

Alessandro Petti

The hopelessly intertwined geography of Israel-Palestine and the increasingly extreme Israeli approaches to unilateral separation offer an uneasy backdrop to the question of what kind of long term strategies should be adopted for building, or rebuilding, a ‘viable’ Palestinian national space. The language of an ‘alternative’ future is a response to the seemingly inescapable progress of ‘spaciocide’ and the increasingly limited possibilities that this seems to offer to Palestinians; and therefore the need to envisage a different image of a future towards which to plan; a new spatio-political horizon. This ‘planning’ process is not simply a challenge for architects, politicians and economists; it is one that needs to harness the participation and support of a multitude of agents within Palestinian society and beyond. Petti’s anecdote demonstrates the catalytic potential of architecture in such a collaborative process.

From the perspective of spatial planning, the work of DA has gone some way towards demonstrating the ‘reversibility’ of Israel’s architecture of occupation, whilst Riwaq has started to offer ideas on a regional scale about how to repair the fabric of the Palestinian national space. Birzeit have begun to challenge conventional notions of spatial planning, perhaps empowering their first cohorts of graduates with the necessary tools to take this form of thinking to the next stage. Perhaps the ‘arena of speculation’ opened up by these organisations will help
to transform the approach of Palestinian politicians and to enable a new generation of spatial agency.

Given the interconnected nature of the territory of Israel-Palestine, ‘unilateral’ acts of spatial resistance are unlikely in themselves to produce a stable future geography; an ultimate separation or integration of ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’. The notion of ‘spatial planning’ in this context should be of harnessing the collective power of such acts as a tool to transform the socio-political landscape and to reconfigure the dominant structures of spatial power.

Perhaps more than anything else, the work of those interviewed for this research offers evidence of a ‘joint struggle’ on the ground that continues in spite of the deadlock at a political level. Although it is not a centrally coordinated struggle, it involves cross-border and cross-community cooperation to resist a form of injustice and discrimination that all of these groups perceive to have damaging consequences in both the short and long term. Perhaps it is upon the physical and social foundations laid by such cooperation that a different future can be built; whether through ‘building walls together’ or through building ‘something else’.
End Notes

1 Decode Jerusalem (Flickr Creative Commons, 2007) <http://www.flickr.com/photos/19359764@N07> [accessed 5 January 2010]

2 Ibid.


4 This is particularly true for the Druze and Bedouin communities. Jonathan Cook suggests that this is the product of an Israeli “divide and rule” strategy, where the ‘Arabs’ in Israel are identified as a series of discrete ethno-religious communities and self-identification as ‘Palestinian’ is viewed as ‘disloyal’. See Jonathan Cook, “The Tribal Factor”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 801 (2006) <http://www.jkcook.net/Articles2/0251.htm> [accessed 5 January 2010]

5 At the time of writing there is a political rift within the PA, with the West Bank administration dominated by the Fatah party, and the Gaza Strip administration dominated by the Hamas party.


9 The prominent ‘security’ barrier constructed by Israel mostly on Palestinian land in the West Bank. ‘Wall’ is the term used by the International Court of Justice in their 2004 advisory ruling declaring the construction “contrary to international law.” See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 2004).


13 Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman eds., p. 15.

14 Mouin Rabbani, “The Palestinians of Israel: An Interview with Azmi Bishara” in ed. by Roane Carey, pp. 139-147 (p. 139).

15 The term ‘Zionist project’ refers here to the efforts to found a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and later efforts to expand the Jewish presence and territory within Israel-Palestine.


17 Weizman, p. 87.

18 Hanafi in ed. by Misselwitz and Rieniets.


21 Palestinians refer to this event as the Nakba (Arabic “catastrophe”).


26 Ibid.

27 Yehezkel Lein et al, p.93.

28 Weizman, p. 12.

29 “Until a final agreement is signed, the international law applicable to the status of Israeli settlement is international humanitarian law. Two major international instruments, which relate to treatment of civilians during war, deal with the subject: the Hague Regulations (1907) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949); see Yuval Ginbar, Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories as a Violation of Human Rights: Legal and Conceptual Aspects (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1997) <http://www.btselem.org/Download/199703_Settlements_Eng.rtf> [accessed 10 December 2009], (p. 4).

30 White, p.48.


33 All of the major Israeli political parties – Likud, Kadima, Labor and Yisrael Beitenu – believe in maintaining Israel as a ‘Jewish’ state.

34 See appendix Interview Notes #6.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 White, p.48-49.

38 In reality much of the ‘state land’ in Israel is the property of Palestinian refugees. See section 2.3.

39 The ‘Israel Land Council’, Ibid.

40 Quote from JNF response to a petition filed by Adalah to the Supreme Court of Israel, see Adalah, UN Rejects Jewish National Fund’s Application for Consultative Status (Haifa: Adalah, 2007) <http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/pr.php?file=07_05_23> [accessed 10 December 2009]

41 “Whereas in the 1950s and early 1960s state planning was undertaken by professional architects and planners, after the 1967 war it was mainly undertaken by politicians, generals and ideological activists”, Weizman, p. 88.

42 Ibid., p.5

43 White, p. 50.


46 White, p. 45.

47 Ibid., p. 52.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., p. 46.

50 See appendix Interview Notes #6.

51 Weizman, p. 116-117.

52 See also 3.4

53 Weizman, p. 108.

54 See appendix Interview Notes #1.

55 White, p. 48.


58 UN OCHA.
59  Ibid.
60  Jeff Halper of ICAHD suggests that in 2008 there were around three times more home demolitions in Israel than in the OPTs, see appendix Interview Notes #5.
62  See appendix Interview Notes #5.
63  Weizman, p. 12.
64  michaelramallah (Flickr Creative Commons, 2006) <http://www.flickr.com/photos/michaelimage> [accessed 5 January 2010]
65  These classifications are defined by the author.
66  Not to be confused with former Prime Minister and military leader Ariel Sharon.
67  Zvi Efrat in ed. by Segal and Weizman, pp. 59-76 (p. 64).
68  Ibid.
69  Ibid., p. 65.
70  Israel also maintains ultimate control of Palestinian border terminals with Jordan and, via third party agreements, has been central to the ongoing closures of the Rafah crossing from the Gaza Strip to Egypt. See Weizman, p. 139-153.
71  Yazid Anani suggests that Martin Seligman’s psychological theory of “learned helplessness” was intentionally employed to this effect by Israel in the design and operation of the checkpoint system, see appendix Interview Notes #4.
72  A number of these roads are exclusive to settlers, see B’Tselem, Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Road Regime in the West Bank (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2004) <http://www.btselem.org/Download/200408_Forbidden_Roads_Eng.pdf> [accessed 11 December 2009]
73  See appendix Interview Notes #6.
74  Halper of ICAHD explains ‘it’s one unit [Israel-Palestine] … the Trans-Israel Highway that comes through the country, but it doesn’t come into the occupied territories, so nobody relates to it; but it’s the new demographic spine of Israel’, see appendix Interview Notes #5.
75  Weizman explains that these principles were formalised in a 1984 Ministry of Construction and Housing guidebook entitled ‘Building and Development in the Mountain Regions’, Weizman, p. 130
76  Segal and Weizman “The Mountain: Principles of Buildings in Heights” in ed. by Segal and Weizman, pp. 79-96 (p. 84-85)
77  “from everywhere you can spot the settlement on the hilltop, looming, dreadfully colonial … alienated, threatening, conquering houses, lusting for more”, see Gideon Levy, “The Lowest Points in Israel” in ed. by Segal and Weizman, pp. 167-172 (p. 170)
80  Farhat Muhawi of Riwaq underlines the neglect of the historic cores of Palestinian villages and how many buildings are uninhabited, see appendix Interview Notes #3.
82  ‘Demographic threat’ is a term in common use amongst Israeli politicians.
84  Weizman, p.93.
85  See Yehezkel Lein et al.
87  ‘If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights, then, as soon as that happens, the State of Israel is finished.’ Quoted by Aluf Benn, David Landau, Barak Ravid and Shmuel Rosner, “Olmert to Haaretz: Two-state solution, or Israel


90 See note 29.


92 These categories are defined by the author.


95 See appendix Interview Notes #6.

96 See note 55.

97 See appendix Interview Notes #6.

98 See appendix Interview Notes #3.

99 Ibid.

100 ‘our role had been to come in as an Arab organisation which knows the needs of the Arab citizens – they trust us and they respect our organisation – so it’s easy for the residents to talk to us and to voice their concerns,’ see appendix Interview Notes #6.

101 “What happens is that the regular citizens don’t know about these, or what they mean. In an announcement they would say ‘land plot no. 55 in this town will be affected this way’ or ‘this is going to happen to this area,’ and most of the land owners, they don’t even know what their plot number is,” ibid.,

102 Ibid.

103 See appendix Interview Notes #1.

104 “we do that … educate professionals and decision makers, because they have the power – the legal power – to make changes. We’ve held various study days on different issues,” see Interview Notes #6.

105 See also Bimkom, Beersheba Metropolitan Plan and the Issue of the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev (Jerusalem: Bimkom, 2005) <http://eng.bimkom.org/Index.asp?CategoryId=101&ArticleID=95> [accessed 5 January 2010]

106 “when we approach the state; when we advocate for the state to do certain things, they don’t just view us as an Arab organisation that’s trying to object to things. We come in with plans, and everything is professional; it’s written down and clear. So, to them, they view us as a professional organisation”, see appendix Interview Notes #6.

107 See appendix Interview Notes #6.

108 See appendix Interview Notes #1.

109 Ibid.


111 “In light of the fighting in Gaza and in Israel, Israeli human rights groups, including Bimkom, are working together to inform the public of the impact on civilians, particularly regarding events that are not reported by the media.” See Bimkom, Home: Human Rights in Gaza and Israel During the Hostilities (Jerusalem: Bimkom, 2009) <http://eng.bimkom.org> [accessed 5 January 2010]

112 See appendix Interview Notes #5.

113 Jeff Halper, Obstacles to Peace: A Re-Framing of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 4th edn (Jerusalem: ICAHD, 2009)

114 See appendix Interview Notes #3.

115 Ibid.

116 The term “arena of speculation” was coined by Decolonizing Architecture, see appendix Interview Notes #7.

117 Ibid.

“Usually architecture, instead of opening different possibilities, on the contrary, it closes them because it’s a pre-configuration of the future.” Ibid., p. 1.

“For two years we involved the students at Birzeit … This year they are having a class based on the ideas of DA … So, this idea takes a completely autonomous form”, Ibid. p. 2.

See appendix Interview Notes #4.

See appendix Interview Notes #7.

See section 3.5.

See appendix Interview Notes #3.

“Think-Net we call it – bringing twenty internationals from different disciplines – artists, business people, anthropologists, architects, archaeologists – and sixty locals, to work with us on this rehabilitation and to think with us about what we are doing. We are already doing it, but we need help; you always need help”, Ibid.

See appendix Interview Notes #4.


“The PA is really trying to consider the (Israeli) settlements for the use of Palestinians, and also organically integrating them inside the Palestinian urban fabric.” see appendix Interview Notes #7.

See section 2.3.

See appendix Interview Notes #5.

“We just did this work camp in Anata that was paid for by the Spanish government. It’s the second year. They even paid for forty young Spanish people to fly over to be volunteers.” Ibid.

See section 2.4.
Interview Notes

Details of interviews: locations, dates and descriptions of organisations and individuals interviewed.

Interview #1: Karen Pacht, Bimkom (Planners for Planning Rights)
West Jerusalem, Israel
(6:30pm, Tuesday 1st September 2009)

(Extracts from description of Bimkom on website – http://eng.bimkom.org)
Bimkom is an Israeli non-profit organization formed in 1999 by a group of planners and architects, with the aim of strengthening democracy and human rights in the field of planning …

Key objectives:
- To advance the implementation of planning rights (i.e. human rights in the field of spatial planning) at all levels of the decision-making process.
- To strengthen community involvement in the planning process by empowering local communities with the tools to participate effectively in the planning decisions that affect their lives, and to develop solutions that reflect their needs and preferences.
- To stimulate professional and public discourse with regard to planning rights and social aspects of planning, and thus help bring about change in this field.
- To raise awareness and understanding within the general public of their planning rights and the measures that can be taken if their rights are affected.

… Bimkom employs a three-prong approach to achieve its objectives: community planning assistance; planning and legal advocacy; education and public outreach.

Interview #2: Judeh Jamal, former Team Leader on the Palestinian Authority Reform and Development Plan
East Jerusalem/Ramallah, West Bank
(10:00am, Wednesday 2nd September 2009)

(Description by author)
Judeh Jamal is a strategic planning and development consultant based in East Jerusalem and Ramallah. In addition to his current work with Philistia Foundation, an independent non-profit organisation supporting national development and youth empowerment in the Palestinian territories.

Previously, Jamal has worked with various Palestinian NGOs, and worked as a senior consultant to current PA Prime Minister Dr Salam Fayyad on the 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP); the first long term inter-departmental strategic national development plan produced by the PA.

Interview #3: Farhat Muhawi, Director of Riwaq: Centre for Architectural Conservation
Ramallah, West Bank
(2:30pm, Monday 7th September 2009)

(Extracts from description of Riwaq on website – http://www.riwaq.org)
RIWAQ, established in (1991) is a Ramallah based non-profit non-governmental organization whose main aim is the protection and development of architectural heritage in Palestine.

Riwaq’s activities include the Riwaq’s Registry of Historic Building; an inventory of fifty one thousand buildings, the implementation of more than fifty conservation projects in major West Bank towns and villages, a number of Protection Plans for Historic Centers, the publication of fourteen books on cultural heritage, and a beautiful Photo Archive.

Realizing the difficulties and challenges facing cultural heritage protection, Community Out-Reach activities are implemented in close cooperation with the public and the private sectors of the society.
Interview #4: Yazid Anani, Assistant Professor in Department of Architecture at Birzeit University

Ramallah, West Bank
(4:30pm, Monday 7th September 2009)

(Description from DA website – http://www.decolonizing.ps)

Yazid Anani is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Architecture and Master Program in Planning and Landscape Architecture at Birzeit University, Birzeit. His current research interests are: cross-border development and co-operations, spatial planning and relationships of differences, planning and power, communication & capacity in planning, and border studies.

Yazid Anani received his B.S. in Architectural Engineering in 1997 from the Birzeit University, Palestine, and his M.S. in Landscape Architecture in 2000 from the Agricultural University of Norway (UMB), Norway. He received his Dr. rer. pol. in Spatial Planning in 2006 from Dortmund University, Germany. He joined the Department of Architecture and the master program in Planning and landscape Architecture in 1998. Yazid Anani received a certificate in “Sustainable Development Strategies & Conflict Resolution” from the University of Middle East (UME) in 2000 and a stage certificate in “Regional & Urban Planning and Development” from the Politecnico di Milano in 1998.

Interview #5: Jeff Halper, Director of Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD)

West Jerusalem, Israel
(1:00pm, Wednesday 9th September 2009)

(Extracts from description of ICAHD on website – http://www.icahd.org)

ICAHD is a non-violent, direct-action group originally established to oppose and resist Israeli demolition of Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories. As our activists gained direct knowledge of the brutalities of the Occupation, we expanded our resistance activities to other areas - land expropiation, settlement expansion, by-pass road construction, policies of “closure” and “separation,” the wholesale uprooting of fruit and olive trees and more. The fierce repression of Palestinian efforts to “shake off” the Occupation following the latest Intifada has only added urgency to our efforts…

…Since its founding, ICAHD’s activities have extended to three interrelated spheres: resistance and protest actions in the Occupied Territories; efforts to bring the reality of the Occupation to Israeli society; and mobilizing the international community for a just peace. Our activities include:

• Resisting the demolition of Palestinian homes.
• Disseminating information and networking.
• Providing strategic practical support to Palestinian families and communities.

Interview #6: Jumanah Essa-Hadad and Enaya Banna-Geries, Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP)

Eilaboun, Israel
(10:00am, Friday 11th September 2009)

(Extracts from description of ACAP on website – http://www.ac-ap.org)

The Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP), a non-governmental, non-profit organization located in Eilaboun, Israel (Galilee), was established in December 2000. ACAP has developed into a national address that represents the genuine needs and interests of the Arab citizens of Israel on issues of planning, land, housing, and development…

ACAP works towards equality and integration of Israel’s Arab citizens into public life activities, while preserving their cultural features and national identity, and closing existing gaps between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel in various spheres of life, including housing, planning, infrastructure, transportation, social services, education, environment, and employment. ACAP advances these aims and serves the Arab population through a highly professional team of urban planners and other relevant professionals.

ACAP’s goals and objectives include:

• Empowering Arab municipalities, leaders, planning
professionals, and the public to protect basic human rights related to planning.

- Advocating for more democratic planning practices and policies towards the Arab minority.
- Systematically monitoring, evaluating, and following-up all State official decisions on plans, land, and development projects concerning the Arab minority.
- Raising public awareness on discriminatory plans that abuse planning rights and as needed, work with the community to file legal objections or create alternative planning solutions.
- Promoting Arab-Jewish cooperation in planning for economic, social, and human development of all Israeli citizens.
- Conducting research on social and economic planning problems that affect Arab communities in order to develop possible solutions and alternatives for coping with such issues.

Interview #7: Alessandro Petti, Director of Decolonizing Architecture (DA)
Bethlehem, West Bank
(12:00noon, Friday 27th November 2009)

(Extracts from description of DA on website – http://www.decolonizing.ps)

Our project uses architecture to articulate the spatial dimension of a process of decolonization. Recognizing that Israeli colonies and military bases are amongst the most excruciating instruments of domination, the project assumes that a viable approach to the issue of their appropriation is to be found not only in the professional language of architecture and planning but rather in inaugurating an “arena of speculation” that incorporates varied cultural and political perspectives through the participation of a multiplicity of individuals and organizations.

The project engages a less than ideal world. It does not articulate a utopia of ultimate satisfaction. Its starting point is not a resolution of the conflict and the just fulfilment of all Palestinian claims; also, the project is not, and should not be thought of, in terms of a solution. Rather it is mobilizing architecture as a tactical tool within the unfolding struggle for Palestine. It seeks to employ tactical physical interventions to open a possible horizon for further transformations.

We suggest revisiting the term of “decolonization” in order to maintain a distance from the current political terms of a “solution” to the Palestinian conflict and its respective borders. The one-, two-, and now three-state solutions seem equally entrapped in a “top-down” perspective, each with its own self-referential logic. Decolonization implies the dismantling of the existing dominant structure — financial, military, and legal — conceived for the benefit of a single national-ethnic group, and engaging a struggle for justice and equality.