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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TEL AVIV-JAFFA

“There is a fear in Israeli society of mixing with the ‘other’ community in the country: purified localities are preferred as a bulwark against erosion of the state’s special character.”

(Falah, 1996, 827)

1.1 ‘The Only Democracy in the Middle East’

Ethnic Democracy or Ethnocracy?

The association of Israel, as a self-defined Jewish state, with democracy was established from its founding and used as a political bridge, connecting it to governments in the West. This rhetoric has conflated the notion of being Jewish with that of being democratic, suggesting that one cannot exist without the other. Despite the overt tensions between citizenship and ethnicity (Yiftachel, 2002), this assumption was not called into question until the 1990s when a debate among Israeli academics began to interrogate the compatibility of the definition of the state as Jewish with the values of democracy. A model of ‘ethnic democracy’ was offered (Smooha, 1990), which recognised the systemic discrimination against the state’s Palestinian minority yet located it within an overall cloak of democracy, which guaranteed political and civic rights (Yiftachel, 2002). In practice however, this only served to justify a “two-tiered democracy” (Peled, 1992, 440), one that prevented the Arab minority from participating in the ‘common good’ and the republican facet of citizenship (Peled, 1992).

The acceptance of such a citizenship, while consistent with liberal sensibilities, inherently prevents Arabs from exercising a citizenship equal to their Jewish counterparts (Jamal, 2002). By extension the ethnic democracy model is primarily concerned not with the principles of democracy, but rather with the preservation of the dominant ethnicity (Ghanem, 2000) albeit within a framework of limited democratic freedoms. It holds an “ideological outlook that to begin with is not one of equality” (Jamal, 2002, 425) and is reliant not on the consent but the control of the ethnic minority (Yiftachel, 2006). It also fails to address the effective expansion of Israeli control into the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the absence of any channels for the democratic representation of the occupied population.

In response to this model, others have proposed that the term ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 1997a) is more apt to explain the form of government operating in Israel. While the ethnocracy model agrees that the state has democratic tendencies, it argues that these are present in the features, not the structure of the regime (Yiftachel, 2006). As the state is part of the dominant ethnic group, its ability to remain neutral is considered doubtful in a setting where no

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1 Israeli citizens of Palestinian origin are commonly referred to as Arab-Israelis. Here, both terms, Palestinian and Arab, will be used interchangeably to describe this demographic and its culture.
measures exist to prevent the tyranny of the majority. Were they present, such mechanisms might include a constitution, a bill of rights, the scope for minority veto and cultural-regional autonomy (Yiftachel, 2006). Accordingly, the lack of democracy is not so much attributed to the Jewish character of the state but rather these systemic shortcomings, which ensure a constant process of Judaization and de-Arabization.

**Land + Identity in Israel / Palestine**

At its core the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of land, of the contestation of competing narratives by the ‘rightful’ inhabitants of the same territory. Two ethnic groups are, in essence, asserting separate national projects with the aim of gaining the most territory carrying the least number of people belonging to the ‘other’ (Monterescu and Rabinowitz, 2007). This logic has permeated all proposed resolutions to the conflict from the start of the 20th century, including the ubiquitous United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 (Figure 1.1), which called for the creation of two states within historic Palestine. Peace plans have continued to forge ahead, predicated on the assumption that the populations must first be separated and partitioned (Weizman, 2007).

The 1948 War and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 have deeply fragmented the Palestinian community, dividing it into three distinct groups: Palestinians who remained in historic Palestine in 1948 and would later become citizens of the Israeli state (approximately 20% of the current Israeli population), Palestinians who currently reside within the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Diaspora, which resides outside present-day Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These three forms of separation (Bishara, 2008) are evidenced today in the continued expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland through the denial of their right of return, the building of the separation wall between Israel proper and the West Bank, and the exclusion of Palestinian-Israelis from equal citizenship.

The spatial policies of the Israeli state have served to strengthen its control of land and cement these

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2 Israel / Palestine refers to the current geo-political reality, which encompasses Israel proper, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
3 Historic Palestine refers to the pre-1948 geographical area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Today this region translates to Israel proper, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
forms of separation. Since the establishment of the state, central government was heavily involved in the planning effort, directing the rapid construction of new settlements throughout the country in a bid to increase the legitimacy of the state (Efrat, 2003). The Law of Return coupled with the Absentee Property Law, both enacted in 1950, ensured Jewish control over vast areas within the borders of the present Israeli state. Respectively, they legalised the granting of citizenship to any person of Jewish ethnicity who wished to immigrate to the state, while denying Palestinians who had fled during the war their right to reassume their properties. This concerted struggle for the control of land and by extension the formation of ‘justifiable’ ethno-national claims and identities is at the core of the strategies employed by the Israeli state.

1.2 Planning and Citizenship in Tel Aviv-Jaffa

Defying the Logic of Separation: the ‘Mixed’ City

Within Israel common discourse refers to Jewish cities, Arab cities and ‘mixed’ cities. Existing research (Adalah, 2000; Yiftachel, 2006) has sought to highlight the disparity in government resources allocated to Jewish cities in comparison to Arab ones and in particular the lack of planning permission granted to the development of Arab cities. Quasi-state agencies such as the Jewish National Fund, which owns 13% of all the land in Israel, give preference to Israel’s Jewish citizens. This planning bias towards one ethnic group over another has permeated all facets of life including access to housing, employment, education, health and basic infrastructure.

Of interest here is the emergence of the ‘mixed’ city - a space where communities of both ethnic groups defy the logic of separation. It is only in the six mixed cities of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Haifa, Ramle, Lydda, Acre and Upper Nazareth that Jews and Arabs reside, work, learn, play and travel together. Here, the “self” and the “other” have no choice but to coexist in the urban space and thus be mutually recognised (Monterescu, 2007). The label of “mixed city” is, in itself, a reinforcement of socio-political attitudes while reflecting the actual demographic reality (Monterescu and Rabinowitz, 2007).

It has been argued that conceptualising these cities as ‘mixed’ is misleading (Yacobi and Yiftachel, 2003), given the dominance of one ethnic group over another, as reflected in spatial segregation and economic disparities resulting from the ethnic division of labour. Though this “coexistence” confronts severe discrimination, urban spaces provide the opportunity to reproduce, reform and contest these power relations. It is in urban space that socio-spatial exclusion is more evident, where its denial is indicative of the limits to formal citizenship. Palestinians living in ‘mixed’ cities (comprising 9% of the total Palestinian population inside Israel) confront oppression at both the urban and the national scales - their status is one of marginality within marginality. The existence of the ‘mixed’ city is therefore an important precedent and case for rigorous study.
Urban Social Movements in Tel Aviv-Jaffa

The objective of this dissertation is to examine this planning-citizenship relationship in the context of urban space and a particular form of government, the ethnocracy. The focus will be on the struggle of Palestinian-Israelis in the locality of Jaffa, which today can be considered a large neighbourhood within the municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (Figure 1.2). While it is recognised that other ethnic minorities face related discrimination, the reality of Palestinian-Israelis is particularly relevant given the controversy and contradictions in their citizenship at the international and national levels. The following discussion and analysis rests primarily on the use of secondary research and data.

The ‘mixed’ city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa provides a case study that interweaves themes of citizenship, planning and urban space. Spatially the juxtaposition of Jaffa, as the socio-economic Arab centre of historic Palestine, with Tel Aviv, conceived as its Jewish modern antithesis, exemplifies the wider conflict. Indeed both the explicit and implicit borders between Tel Aviv and Jaffa shadow the political discourse at the international level (Hatuka and Kallus, 2006). Importantly, any critical research of Tel Aviv must be undertaken with an awareness of its relation to Jaffa (Rotbard, 2005). The control over land and historical narrative, supported by planning endeavours, served as the basis for citizenship formation within Tel Aviv-Jaffa, which merged into one metropolis in 1950.

This dissertation is positioned in a global context whereby liberalisation policies have promoted the market, given its neutrality and rationality, to catalyse a level playing field, to provide a platform of equal opportunities. Urban development has followed a parallel path, modelled on a market logic that yields similar practices to attain analogous outcomes. Concurrently planning discourses have sought to incorporate theories of participation and citizenship. Planning is conceived as an opportunity to encourage direct democracy and strengthen relationships between the state and its citizens (Gaventa, 2004). Given the range of citizenships present in today’s increasingly diverse and multicultural cities, planning has become a critical challenge. In Israel and Tel Aviv-Jaffa we see the impact of these wider trends on an ethnically divided society, structured on deep inequalities.

Conscious of these realities, our area of concern is the potential of urban social movements in Jaffa to advance their struggle for urban space, effectively an urban justice, to the assertion of a substantive citizenship. The corollary between urban space and citizenship will first (Chapter 2) be situated within the ethnocracy and its associated planning(s). An analytical framework will be developed to serve as a guide for the subsequent study of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (Chapter 3), which will examine the strategy of planning, as employed both by the state and urban social movements, in its connection to urban space and citizenship formation. Underpinning this analysis will be the relationship between resources and symbolism at the urban scale with the tensions of citizenship formed at the national. Ultimately, I will seek to address how ‘mixed’ cities can operate as a space to challenge hegemonic discourses of a citizenship linked to ethnicity and what this could imply for Palestinian-Israelis (Chapter 4).
INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TEL AVIV-JAFFA

Figure 1.2 Partial Map of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 2009
Places indicated will feature in Chapters 3 and 4. (Adapted from MAPA Publishers, 2009)
Chapter Two

LOCATING URBAN SPACE AND CITIZENSHIP WITHIN ETHNOCRACIES: THEORY AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

“Meanwhile what of ‘land’? If time (an evocation of the past and of future destinies) is an important dimension in ethnicism and nationalism, so too is space. Ethnic cultures reflect the territories the group inhabits, but in turn they also always actively constitute place in representing it to themselves and others as ‘our country’. In processes like this, space and place can be recognised as social constructs.”
(Cockburn, 1998, 39)

This chapter will first outline the theoretical bases of urban space and citizenship and elaborate how these concepts serve to reinforce and support one another. It will then place these arguments within the context of an ethnocracy and examine how both ethnocratic regimes and urban social movements use planning as a strategy for their own ends.

2.1 Urban Space + Citizenship

Principles of Formal and Substantive Citizenship

Conventional understandings of citizenship view it as a formal relationship between the individual and the state, a social contract binding a set of responsibilities to each party, embodied in the fulfilment of duties and the protection of rights respectively (Assiter, 1999). Routed in libertarian thought this notion believes that all humans are endowed with a set of universal rights (Kabeer, 2005), which the state is obligated to uphold. These rights, related to individual liberty, take precedence over any notions of the public good (Mouffe, 1992). The citizen is understood through the political and civic rights guaranteed by the state. Historically, these rights have been granted from above as well as demanded from below (Turner, 1992).

This framework of citizenship rested on several premises. First, citizenship was conceived as a function to be exercised in the public sphere. This public sphere was considered to be the arena of universal, collective interests while the private sphere was the site of individual interests. The state’s remit and by extension the scope of government and politics was concerned exclusively with issues that took place in the public realm. Debate and resolutions of these issues were predicated on the assumption that the polity was homogenous in nature (Kymlicka, 1995) and thereby the provision of equal, individual rights would suffice to guarantee freedom and liberty. Membership to this political community of citizens was generally afforded to those who shared a common allegiance to a nation (Werbner and Yuval-Davis, 1999), the boundaries of which were demarcated through a discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This articulation legitimised the eventual establishment of the modern nation-state (Appadurai and Holston, 1996) and in this sense; the nation-state itself was built on ideas of exclusivity (Mandanipour, 2007).

Despite the theoretical promise to place all citizens on an equal platform, liberal citizenship has widely been discredited through its failure to fulfil a meaningful and effective framework for freedom, liberty and social justice. Particularly it has been criticised for producing “citizens who
Glaring socio-economic inequalities in the face of supposed political equality have suggested the limitations of a citizenship based wholly on political membership (Turner, 1992). The denial of social, cultural and economic rights impeded the capability to exercise the entitlements of political and civic rights (Kabeer, 2005). While growing economic inequalities did bring support for the growth of the welfare state, current neo-liberal discourse has framed economic rights in terms of the market and a citizen's right to participate and contribute to the state's economy (Dagnino, 2005).

A communitarian argument views as disingenuous the liberal vision of society as homogenous individuals. The reality, it argues, is that humans are social beings that collectively organise into social groups based on a range of identities that value the overall welfare of the community (Assiter, 1999). Further, it believes that citizenship is not relegated to the relationship between the individual and the state but also encompasses that between social groups and the state (Mukhopadhyay, 2007). Mouffe (1992) further asserts that individual liberties are only possible within a 'free state' encompassing active citizens engaged to that end.

As citizenship was traditionally exercised in the public sphere, it favoured those with access to public space, enhancing their capability to strengthen their relationship with the state. Those that belonged to disadvantaged social groups, especially women and ethnic minorities, were excluded from this discourse (Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Young, 1989), resulting in policies that only reinforced the universal interests assumed by the state. With regards to ethnic and national minorities, the “state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others” (Kymlicka, 1995, 108) in its policies governing language, internal boundaries, public holidays and state symbols.

Current social forces resulting in transnational migrations and the strengthening of civil society, coupled with an era of post-colonialism, have given rise to the notion of multicultural citizenship. Individuals define themselves based on a range of social identities, including membership to collective groups, which imply diverse needs, responsibilities and access to resources. This assertion of diverse social identities has shattered the notion of universal individual interests and rights. The challenge is to develop a citizenship able to respond to these diverse claims while upholding the principle of equality. For Kymlicka (1995, 6) a “comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures.”

Thus, if citizenship is believed to be one medium through which to realise social justice, it is necessary to understand what that would entail. It has been argued that social justice theories are largely based on addressing three overarching themes: well being, equality, and the institutionalised structures, which underpin social relations (Smith, 2002). These themes respond to the discourse surrounding distributive notions of social justice related to well being (Harvey, 2009a), with institutional concerns (Young, 1990), which place emphasis on the access to decision-making structures. Young (1990, 37) argued that social justice was, in effect, the removal of institutionalised domination and oppression, defining them as the “institutional constraint on self-determination” and “self-development” respectively. This hypothesis was rooted in the explicit premise that a ‘politics of difference’ (Young, 1990) was required in order to justly address societies comprised of diverse individuals and communities.

If we place these concepts of social justice within the dilemmas surrounding citizenship, themes that define what a substantive citizenship would encompass begin to emerge. This citizenship would uphold not just the visible, formal rights related to civic and political proceedings but also acknowledge their reliance on social, cultural and economic rights (Kabeer, 2005; Nyamu-Musembi, 2007). Necessarily a substantive citizenship would recognise the diversity in society both at the level of the individual and the community, and accord corresponding rights at each level. It would create the space for meaningful citizenship by extending its scope beyond the relationship between the state and the individual, to include structures between individuals and communities (Kabeer, 2005; Nyamu-Musembi, 2007). An active citizen (Dagnino, 2005), who is continuously engaged with the process of citizenship (Mukhopadhyay, 2007), would be the outcome of such a substantive citizenship and ensure its viability in the long term.
An Interdependency: Urban Space and Substantive Citizenship

Before understanding how a substantive citizenship could be promoted in the urban realm, it is critical to establish a framework that will guide the analysis of urban space. It is in the urban space where social relations are produced and reproduced, where individuals and communities assert their identities and where diversity is most evident (Staeheli and Thompson, 1997). As such a deeper reading of space is imperative in any consideration of citizenship formation in the urban context.

In his work, *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre (1991) outlines a theory that moved beyond scientific and philosophical approaches to space. While rooted in a political economy approach, Lefebvre’s work focuses not on how space facilitates the means of production but rather how space is both the driver and outcome of the reproduction of the social relations, which in turn govern the means of production (Smith, 2008). This effectively strengthens the importance of space, as a primary product of society in its own right, and not simply another component of the means of production (Gottdiener, 1994). This reading of space allows an understanding of its role in the formation and preservation of social relations and further implies entry points to challenge and reform these relationships.

In his thesis Lefebvre distinguishes between the ‘true space’ and the ‘truth of space’. This analytical separation, contrasting the official representations of space with the reality of sensory experience (Carp, 2008), gave credence to the daily practices and routines of life, a theme that occupied Lefebvre. In this scenario, space, much more than its physical manifestations, was dependent on individual subjectivity and experience. Lefebvre approached his theorisation by attempting to reconcile what he termed ‘fields’ of space: physical, mental and social. While mental depictions were most popular, they were also inherently exclusionary, largely produced by those in professional practice (architects, planners, engineers). Lefebvre, therefore, elevated the import of physical and social fields of space, which involved society as a whole in its production. To conceptualise this phenomenon, Lefebvre developed the spatial triad, which can be used as a tool for understanding divergent perceptions of space (Carp, 2008; Yacobi, 2007).

The first aspect of the triad is the *perceived space*, which is related to the concrete, tangible physical space that is experienced in the practice of everyday life. It is through actual movement through space that a sensory experience develops and forms this perceived space. This experience is necessarily dependent on the use of and access to space and hence varying perceived spaces emerge from the same physicality (Carp, 2008).

The *conceived space* refers not to what the body experiences but rather to how the mind conceptualises a space. Also described as representations of space, this aspect is closely linked with professional practice whereby abstract portrayals (e.g. plans, models, maps) take precedence over the sensory and experiential components of space. These symbols of space emerge in diverse forms, communicated orally or visually through images and words, and generally dominate understandings of space. Access to knowledge and power is critical in order to develop the capability to produce conceived space. As such, the serial production of conceived space is prone to reproduce existing power relations.

The final component of Lefebvre’s triad is termed the *lived space*, which describes the highly subjective understandings of space based on the past, present and possible future interactions and experiences within it. This aspect is associated with deep emotional connections to a space, communicated in complex and overlapping mediums. The lived space is a composite, individualised impression. It can be understood to incorporate both the physical and mental fields of space into a wider social field, reinforcing Lefebvre’s notion that it is social relations that underpin any conception of space. Though the perceived and conceived spaces will directly affect lived spaces, the lived space is largely symbolic and operates at a near sub-conscious level. It can be considered a suppressed space.

The previous discussions on space and citizenship now allow a construction of the role urban space can play in substantive citizenship formation. Historically the nation was developed and nurtured in cities, centring its power in order to promote its own growth while controlling popular dissent (Monterescu and Rabinowitz, 2007). Lefebvre (1991, 47) asserts that the “state was built on the back of the old cities, and their structures and code were
shattered in the process”. Yet despite efforts to realign this citizenship to the wider national level, “cities remain the strategic arena for the development of citizenship” (Appadurai and Holston, 1996). These tensions between the scales within which societal membership originates and terminates are crucial to the formation of substantive citizenship (Smith, 2008).

Mandanipour (2007) has argued that social opportunities directly link to spatial opportunities and consequently to patterns of movement and access to resources. These potential constraints on access to urban space will directly impact the perceived, conceived and lived spaces articulated in the spatial triad, and effectively promote exclusivity in the production of space. Yet the relationship between the social and the spatial is a reciprocal one. Both the denial and enhancement of one can negatively or positively impact the other.

It is in cities that this proximity of diversity and conflict directly challenges traditional understandings of citizenship. The city becomes a spatial juxtaposition of inequalities directly related to its strategic role in capital accumulation and the provision of labour (Appadurai and Holston, 1996). This produces a competitive climate in which access to and control of urban space encourages the claiming of rights. These conditions promote an active citizenship both towards the state and between citizens. Accordingly, urban space can be viewed as critical for the growth of a substantive citizenship (Appadurai and Holston, 1996). We can assume that “new social relationships call for a new space, and vice versa” (Lefebvre, 1991, 59).

The linkages between the concepts of the social production of space, substantive citizenship and the role of the city in nation-building and citizenship formation provide the foundation for this dissertation. Particularly, it is the interdependency of substantive citizenship and the perceived, conceived and lived urban space that serves as the pivot of the analytical framework to follow.

2.2 Ethnocracy + Planning

This section will explore how urban space and substantive citizenship exist within ethnocracies and how their potential transformation is dominated by the ethnocratic regime.

**Principles of Ethnocracy**

Yiftachel has developed the model of ethnocracy to describe a distinct regime type that “facilitates the expansion, ethnicization and control of a dominant ethnic nation over contested territory and polity” (2006, 11) whilst containing democratic features such as elections, civic rights and parliamentary systems. Estonia, Sri Lanka, Australia and Israel are, or were, examples of such ethnocratic regimes.

Ethnocracies develop at the intersection of colonialism, nationalism and capitalism, resulting respectively in the formation of settler societies, ethnonationalism and a system of capital reflecting ethnic discrimination and exclusion. They are conceptually separated from other nation-states with a dominant ethnic group due to their continued partiality to an ethnonation, or ethnos, and undermining of the demos, or group membership based on territory (Yiftachel, 2006). Thus, while minority ethnic groups are granted formal citizenship, most clearly illustrated through their rights to vote and free speech, these structural forces render them incapable of exercising a substantive citizenship. This continued discrimination against minority ethnic groups is a source of tension, which, in addition to the contradictory façade of democracy, is thought to yield regime instability in the long-term.

On these bases Yiftachel outlines several key principles of ethnocracies, summarised here:

- Rights and resources are distributed according to ethnicity, not territorial citizenship, despite claims of democracy
- The borders of the state are in flux and therefore unable to demarcate a clear demos, further encouraging a deliberate immigration of ethnic diasporas
- The state mechanisms are formulated and driven by the “charter” settler ethnoclass
- Segregation by class and ethnicity creates socio-economic levels of both ethnoclasses and ethnonations
• The justification for ethnic segregation permeates social and political systems
• Civic and political rights are given to minorities but are impaired by limitations

Structural arrangements in the system of government provide the mechanism by which ethnocracies are able to prioritise one ethnonation. The sites of these structural centres are: demography, violence, territory, economy, law and culture (Yiftachel, 2006). Together, these components create unique conditions that affect the production of perceived, conceived and lived spaces while preventing the formation of substantive citizenship.

The structural forces guiding territory and culture are of particular interest as they directly aim to usurp and supplant the existing geographical bonds and historical narratives of ethnic minorities. The administration of territory is used to guide policies pertaining to land and settlement, which is vital for the continued legitimacy of ethnic control and domination. This reinforces ties to the concept of the ‘homeland’, which is crucial in sustaining and strengthening identity formation. Control of popular culture permeates through public space whereby symbols, images, and routines reflect the dominant ethnos, whilst demeaning counter practices. These mechanisms make “possible the construction of various kinds of knowledge, all of them in one way or another dependent upon the perceived character and destiny of a particular geography” (Said, 1994, 93). It is the struggle or “cultural contest” (Said, 1994, 93) to control the production of, and access to, this knowledge, which drives the policies of ethnocratic regimes.

Planning as Domination: Promoting Urban Injustice

If we accept that space “produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power” (Lefebvre, 1991, 26) it follows that ethnocracies will use space as a means of consolidating their power. Planning strategies employed by ethnocratic regimes are a means to consolidate power over territory and culture thereby promoting the ethnicization of space. This practice has been described as ‘planning as control’ (Yiftachel, 1995), but here the term ‘planning as domination’ will be offered, given both the subordination of an ethnic group and the elevation of another.

Yiftachel (1995) dissects three main components of planning policy, territorial, procedural and socio-economic, in order to understand how planning is exploited in deeply divided societies. Territorial dimensions refer to plans and policies, which demarcate the locations of settlements, social functions, land-use zoning and regulations. Control over the territorial dimension of planning allows for the suppression of minority expansion into space whilst ensuring that dominant ethnic groups retain privileged access to desired areas. Further, within urban centres, territorial control often promotes ethnic spatial segregation to maintain ‘pure’ spaces for living. The delineations of administrative boundaries can be favourable to this end, ensuring that the dominant ethnic group maintains a skewed, yet ‘democratic’, hegemony over space.

Procedural aspects of planning comprise the decision-making mechanisms and bureaucratic structures which design and implement planning policies and projects. Ethnic minorities find it difficult to gain access to these institutions as they are constructed in a way that is inherently favourable to the dominant ethnic group. Lack of access to decision-making can further marginalise and exclude disadvantaged communities. Tokenistic participatory measures can be offered in a bid to legitimise and soften pre-prepared discriminatory plans.

In the long term uneven planning policies result in deepening inequalities related to the deprivation and dependency of ethnic minorities, forming the socio-economic dimension of planning as domination. A sustained effort to limit the access to resources prevents minority ethnic groups from developing their capacities to challenge the ethnoclass divide. A deepening cycle of dependency on the privileged ethnic group is created, reinforcing its domination and superiority.

Using the territorial, procedural and socio-economic facets of planning, ethnocracies are able to manipulate the control of and access to resources to the advantage of the dominant ethnic group. It is this form of institutional control and domination with which Young (1990) was concerned in her theory of social justice. The removal of these structures is considered imperative in order for social justice to be realised.

Thus planning as domination can be understood as a means to promote an urban injustice.
2.3 Urban Social Movements + Planning

Just as ethnocratic regimes recognise planning as a strategy to cement the domination of an ethnic group, urban social movements too can engage with planning to transform the prevailing perception of urban space and citizenship.

Principles of Urban Social Movements

History has shown that “no vision, any more than any social system, has total hegemony over its domain” (Said, 1994, 225). In a context where the state exercises overwhelming power to control and dominate ethnic groups, the scope for action by opposition movements can seem marginal. However agency is recognised to be part of a “duality” (Giddens, 1984, 25), which shapes and, in turn, is shaped by structure. From this outlook there is always the capacity to act in some shape or form, however minimal or inconsequential it may seem. Significantly, a view, which believes that the “micro-practices of everyday life are…key sites for the mobilisation of transformative power”, (Healey, 2006, 49) can provide direction for mobilisation and social change.

This concept can be employed when understanding the structural forces at play between the state and society. Migdal (2001) asserts the ‘state in society’ model to represent these relationships. While the state exists in a field of power, its practice is not always unitary, but rather comprised of a set of disparate and often contradictory components. The state operates within a set of rules or laws that face constant contestation, challenging its boundaries, if not physically then socially. It is citizenship that provides the interface between the state and society (Peled and Shafir, 2002), the site for these struggles to be framed.

Cities have changed to such a degree that binary formulations of structure and agency have been rendered inapplicable (Soja, 1996). Rather, urban social movements must use the possibilities inherent in the space of marginalisation to garner resistance strategies (bell hooks in Soja, 1996) towards the state. These strategies prompt the expansion and redefining of the parameters of citizenship. As Said explains the struggle for geography “is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and canons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings” (1994, 6). Nowhere is this struggle more apparent than in the city.

Planning as Opposition: Promoting Urban Justice

Whereas ethnocratic regimes use planning as a tool for domination, urban social movements can conversely use a ‘planning as opposition’ as a form of struggle. In the “urban intersections of space, power and social justice” (Soja, 1996, 184) lie entry points for the creation of sustained resistance to urban injustice and the foundations for identity formation based on space and place (Massey, 1996). Urban social movements combine “formal, legal strategies with informal survival livelihood practices and with oppositional practices” (Miraftab, 2009, 37) to achieve their goals. Here we will discuss what this endeavour of planning as opposition could entail and its implications for urban space and citizenship.

In ethnically diverse societies Fenster (1993) has proposed the distinction between ‘ethnic needs’ and ‘citizen needs’. Ethnic minorities, while demanding for their own cultural, religious and national interests to be considered in planning, still aspire to be enveloped in an umbrella identity of the ‘citizen’, a classification that would render them equals. ‘Ethnic needs’ result in policies which reflect and respond to group uniqueness while ‘citizen needs’ focus on the equal treatment and rights of individuals, potentially encouraging social cohesion in ethnically divided societies. However, the separation of the ‘citizen’ from the ‘ethnic’ implies a citizenship that does not itself encompass the totality of rights - political, civic, economic, social and cultural - that are constitutive of a substantive citizenship.

From an alternative origin, Fainstein (1996) analyses three approaches to social justice - political economy, post-structuralist and urban populism – to articulate the components of an urban justice. These approaches are translated into objectives of equality, diversity, and democracy and better align with the struggles of urban social movements under ethnocratic regimes and the discriminatory planning policies they employ. They act as a counter to the planning as domination exercised by the state whilst also asserting their own needs, as citizens to be understood both individually and collectively.

A political economy approach to social justice positions itself in relation to the capitalist modes of
production and consumption, which it believes yield an unequal distribution of goods and burdens within society. As such, Marxist analysis is most concerned with the economic well being of the individual and any social justice project would be aimed at achieving this end. It is the outcome and not the process that is most crucial in this formulation of social justice.

By contrast, post-structuralists view social justice through a lens prioritising the right to difference and cultural politics. They recognise that class affiliation is but one of many social identities and argue against universalist rights which are perceived as sterile and exclusive. While their rhetoric suggests integration and inclusion, post-structuralist ideas have failed to attract popular support given the difficulty of creating a unified movement based on the paradox of promoting diverse interests.

The final approach Fainstein outlines is that of urban populism, which centres on calls for democracy and libertarian ideas of citizenship. These movements are created from populist bases critical of what they deem cultural elitism in postmodern thinking. While promoting democratic values of equality and liberty, urban populist movements tend to spiral into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ politics whereby they represent the natural, universal against the abnormal, foreign.

Fainstein recognises that each of these approaches yields components of what an urban justice would feature. Urban social movements struggle to assert and balance these claims of equality, diversity and democracy. These tensions create an apparent contradiction in the desire to be considered both on universalist and particularist terms. This is ever more apparent in ethnically divided societies where access to resources and decision-making is accorded along ethnic lines. A force to counter discriminatory planning is required, one that demands equality and diversity within a democratic framework.

Thus planning as opposition can be understood as a means to promote an urban justice.
2.4 Analytical Framework

A Conceptual Model: Urban Space | Citizenship | Planning in Ethnocracies

Based on the premises outlined above, a model can be formulated to illustrate the connections between urban space, citizenship and planning in ethnocracies (Figure 2.1). At the centre of such a model lies the reciprocal relationship between urban space and citizenship, comprising Lefebvre's spatial triad and formal and substantive citizenships. In the context of ethnocracies, planning provides a key method by which to impact these dimensions of urban space and citizenship.

Both ethnocratic regimes and urban social movements can use planning for their own ends, namely to advance a planning as domination or a planning as opposition. A planning as domination serves to control the territorial, procedural and socio-economic aspects of planning to further the ethnicization of space in favour of the dominant ethnonation. This directly impacts the interdependency between urban space and citizenship and undermines the scope for a substantive citizenship of ethnic minorities, promoting an urban injustice.

Urban social movements conversely use a planning as opposition strategy to promote the rights to equality, diversity and democracy. They recognise that "symbolic inclusion does not necessarily entail material re-distribution" (Miraftab, 2009, 34) and as such use a rights-based approach to combine concerns with material well being, ethnic group identification and freedom (Kabeer, 2005), promoting an urban justice. These movements have the capacity to adapt to continual changes on the ground (Appadurai and Holston, 1996), especially crucial in ethnocratic societies where regime instability yields divergent and contradictory logic in a bid to retain its survival.

From Urban Justice to Citizenship

The claims of democracy and the granting of partial rights to ethnic minorities by ethnocratic regimes are precisely the “cracks and crevices” (Yiftachel, 2006, 39) that provide minorities a ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Safier, 2002). Ironically it is the continual rhetoric of democracy that spurs minority consciousness and mobilisation (Yiftachel, 2006). This paper posits that urban social movements utilise a planning as opposition strategy in order to expose and exploit these opportunities. Cities inherently facilitate a strengthened sense of identity and solidarity amongst ethnic minority groups, providing resilience and a bond for their struggle (Yiftachel, 2009). Indeed “no discussion of the emergence of nationalism and the management of ethnic relations in modern nation-states can ignore the pivotal role of cities in both generating and challenging the ethnonational order” (Yacobi and Yiftachel, 2003, 676). Thus cities can provide the site for both the creation and resolution of ethnonational conflict.

A planning as opposition as employed by urban social movements can be differentiated into three separate, yet embedded demands for urban justice: rights to equality, diversity and democracy. It is argued here that these demands transform all aspects of urban space - perceived, conceived and lived - and subsequently assert a substantive citizenship both through their actions and their claims-making. Thus "the social movements of the urban poor create unprecedented claims on and to the city, they expand citizenship to new social bases” (Appadurai and Holston, 1996, 198).

It is precisely in the ethnocratic city that this expansion of citizenship is possible given the juxtaposition of spatial tensions and contradictions. Planning is used as a means of ethnic control and domination yet is presented in modern, technical and efficient terms. The prioritisation of knowledge related to the mental field of space and the generation of conceived space, is purposeful and excludes “non-knowledge…vis-à-vis the lived and perceived” (Lefebvre, 1991, 65). At the city scale, resistance to this narrative is constitutive and crucial for the wider struggle of a substantive citizenship at the national scale. Importantly "a broader notion of 'struggle' as a critical aspect of the historic growth of citizenship” (Turner, 1992, 38) should feature in the strategies of movements working towards a substantive citizenship.

Through this process urban social movements increase their capacity to articulate a citizenship from below (Dagnino, 2005) encompassing relationships both with the state and between citizens. Active citizenship is concerned with its “capacity to generate power” (Wolin, 1992, 150) and it is in urban space where sites of power reside within layers of meaning and culture. The transformation of the prevailing hegemony of urban space is imperative in this struggle to redefine what it is to be a citizen.
LOCATING URBAN SPACE AND CITIZENSHIP WITHIN ETHNOCRACIES

Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model: Planning in an Ethnocracy
“The Israeli public space knows only one collective memory, a castrated memory the sole purpose of which is to push away the sense of exile and alienation.”
(Bishara quoted in Rabinowitz, 2001, 75)

The following sections will explore the bases of urban space and citizenship, planning as domination and planning as opposition in the ‘mixed’ city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. As it is necessary to understand the relation of the urban to the national, each section will first outline how these concepts manifest within Israeli national space and then analyse how they contend in Tel Aviv-Jaffa.

3.1 Urban Space + Citizenship

Israel: Segregated Space / Stratified Citizenship

From its inception until the present day, the State of Israel has struggled to establish its own identity, one that would be accepted as both ‘Western’ and ‘Middle Eastern’. This logic is rooted in using the latter to impart legitimacy to the location of the state and the former to reflect the sensibilities of its founders, who were Jewish immigrants from Europe (Ashkenazim). However, as the state was effectively built on an ‘Arab’ space it became necessary to actively eradicate and replace that history and existence with its own. In this sense the state’s goal was to make space devoid of anything Palestinian, a blank canvas upon which to lay the foundation of an Israeli state.

This tension is exposed in the differing perceptions of the result of the 1948 War. While Israelis herald the ‘Day of Independence’, Palestinians across the world commemorate the ‘Nakba’, or catastrophe (Fenster, 2004). This stark contrast prompted a contest over whose narrative would usurp and dominate the other, at all scales: international, national and local. The leaders of the newly established State of Israel considered “the material and the spatial as foundations for the shaping of politics and society” (Yiftachel, 2006, 102) and effectively utilised this awareness in the project of nation-building. State policies were directed towards strengthening the Jewish claim to land, by uncovering and publicising archaeological sites from a Jewish pre-biblical past whilst dismissing and ignoring a recent (Palestinian) past. The acceptance of an Arab narrative was only permissible if regarded far enough in history so as not to threaten the legitimacy of the state (Fenster, 2004).

As such, the socio-spatial dynamics of the state were immediately skewed to represent the dominant ethnoclass of the Ashkenazi Jewish elites (Jamal, 2002) and by definition excluded any relation or connection to the Palestinians who had remained inside Israel and were granted citizenship. The land system, which largely governed the public’s interaction with space, used signage, symbols, and place-naming to affirm a Jewish-Hebrew stamp, resulting in a “production of ethnic space” (Yiftachel,
This manifestation of narrative in urban space reveals whose memory is valued and whose is ignored (Fenster, 2004), directly impacting the production of lived space.

For Palestinians who remained on their land during the 1948 War, the trauma of being severed from their culture and identity, which had been concentrated in the urban centres (Ghanem, 2000; Monterescu, 2009a), left them vulnerable and weak to challenge this overriding version of history. While they were granted Israeli citizenship and were allowed to participate in elections within a year of the War’s conclusion, they lived under military rule until 1966 (Peled, 1992), whereby restrictions on movement curtailed their ability to exercise any form of substantive citizenship. These Palestinians were siphoned off from their previous ethno-nation and refashioned as ‘Arabs’ (Ghanem, 2002) in Zionist, and broader international discourse, a distinction that remains today.

Citizenship in Israel is not based on a common Israeli nationality (Jamal, 2002), rather each citizen is designated a nation separate from Israel. This is based on the establishment of the state as a ‘Jewish nation’ that is for all Jewish people, both inside and outside the borders of the state. Therefore citizenship is always understood in the shadow of the stratification of ethnic identities, its hierarchies reflected in the structures of the state. While Palestinians have had to learn Hebrew and become accustomed to Jewish culture, there are little incentives for Jewish-Israelis to absorb Arab culture (Ghanem, 2002). This ethnicization of sociability is reflected in political representation, which largely follows ethnic lines (Yiftachel, 2001).

Thus citizenship of the Israeli state resulted in several parallel processes: while including Palestinians in the formal structure of the state, it prevented them from full membership on account of being non-Jewish (Yiftachel, 2006); it also separated ‘Arabs’ in Israel from the Palestinians outside. This led “the existing structure of the minority to disintegrate while preventing its integration into the structures of the state” (Ghanem, 2000, 98), effectively denying Palestinians the rights to equality, diversity and democracy, required for a substantive citizenship.

Figure 3.1 Map of Tel Aviv and Jaffa, 1923
(Adapted from Palmer, 1923)
**Jaffa: From ‘Bride of Palestine’ to ‘Liberation’**

The city of Jaffa, renowned for its oranges, was the centre of Palestinian economy and culture prior to 1948 (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009). The success of the export of oranges ignited the development of the industrial and service sectors, elevating the city’s importance both on the regional and international stages. Meanwhile the Jewish settlement of Tel Aviv was founded in 1909 a few kilometres north of Jaffa as the site for the “construction of national identity and cultural difference…based on autonomous communal life and a new spatial order” (Hatuka and Kallus, 2006, 26). Tel Aviv was rapidly developed in a distinctly modern, Bauhaus aesthetic, in contrast (and competition) to Jaffa (Levine, 2005). By 1948 Tel Aviv had surpassed Jaffa in population and economic growth, a precursor to the aftermath of the War that saw Jaffa, once considered the ‘Bride of Palestine’, enter a phase of steep decline.

The Palestinian population living in Jaffa after the War was a mere 4,000 of the estimated 80,000-120,000 who had previously been residents of the city and its outlying suburbs (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009). In order to control this ‘hostile’ population, the Israeli state concentrated all the Palestinians in the al-Ajami neighbourhood and placed them under military rule. This spatial reorientation (Figure 3.1) suddenly reduced Jaffa, physically, mentally and socially, from a thriving Palestinian city to the area of one of its neighbourhoods. The Absentee Property Law, passed in 1950, legally allowed the Israeli state to confiscate any properties that were registered in the absence of its owner. Many Palestinians, living under military rule in al-Ajami, were unable to claim their homes in the Manshiya neighbourhood during this effective inventory, resulting in the loss of their rights to their own property.

Once the Israeli forces gained effective control of Jaffa, a process of de-Arabization was launched. Arabic street names were given Hebrew ones, some in commemoration of Zionist leaders. In other cases numbers were used as placeholders until a Hebrew name could be assigned. This, coupled with the demolition of Arab homes, suggests that the ‘liberation’ of Jaffa was commensurate with the expulsion of its Arab space (Figure 3.2). Despite these actions Israeli leaders were conscious of the

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**Figure 3.2 Yossi Carmel Square**
The square in front of the famous Jaffa Clock Tower, which acts as the entrance to Jaffa from Tel Aviv, was recently named after a famed Jewish-Israeli figure, against the wishes of local residents.
The extreme socio-economic hardships endured by the Palestinian community in Jaffa combined with the psychological effects of military rule resulted in the al-Ajami neighbourhood spiralling into decay, prompting labels such as ‘ghetto’ (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009) and ’Miserable Jaffa’ (Monterescu, 2009a). This association of Jaffa with crime, drugs, and a general lack of morals (Figure 3.4) is present until today, even among Palestinians living in other Israeli cities (Monterescu, 2009a). For the Israeli state the now ‘empty’ Jaffa provided the space to accommodate waves of Jewish immigrants in the 1950s. Manshiya, in particular, was conceived as a transition space, or buffer, between the ‘Jewish’ Tel Aviv and the ‘Arab’ Jaffa (Hatuka and Kallus, 2006). However, this concept was short-lived and discarded a decade later when Manshiya, recognised for its strategic location adjacent to the beach, was largely demolished to make way for projects geared towards the financial and tourism sectors (Monterescu, 2009a).

**Jaffa: Site of Tourism and Gentrification**

Ironically, the Manshiya neighbourhood would eventually be envisaged as a ‘gateway’, primarily a means to frame and enhance the tourism appeal of Jaffa from Tel Aviv (Hatuka and Kallus, 2006). While this connection is disparate in physical terms with modest continuity and relativity in both aesthetics and form, a continuous promenade was built along the beach, connecting Jaffa to Tel Aviv via Manshiya (Figure 3.5) This shift in policy towards Jaffa, from neglect to investment, was catalysed by globalisation forces surfacing in Tel Aviv.

An influx of labour migrants, liberalisation policies and the desire for Tel Aviv to be perceived as a global city (Levine, 2001; Fenster and Yacobi, 2005) resulted in private interests dominating urban development. These processes heightened existing socio-economic inequalities experienced by the Arab population, furthering pushing it into the margins of society. Planning became a tool, not just for the ethnicization of space, but also for the furthering of private, profit-driven interests. However, enacted on an existing segregated space, these market demands only
Figure 3.4 Mural in al-Ajami neighbourhood

Figure 3.5 Promenade connecting Tel Aviv and Jaffa
This view is towards Jaffa, with the distinctive architecture of the Old City shown on the right.
reinforced ethnoclass differentiations.

The 1960s and 70s saw an outward migration of Jewish families who had the economic means to leave Jaffa. The result increased the Palestinian proportion of the population, now 30% of Jaffa’s residents. Development in Tel Aviv had traditionally been concentrated in the North, establishing wealthier neighbourhoods catering to the Ashkenazi elites. Southern Tel Aviv was implicitly slated for lower Jewish ethnoclasses and a growing labour migrant population. Thus Jaffa, bordering these neighbourhoods, was always comprised of various ethnoclasses. Therefore, while Arabs are one of the least distributed ethnic groups in the wider city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (Benjamini and Schnell, 2004), they do live in one of its the most diverse areas.

As Tel Aviv was no longer able to expand northwards, it set its sights on the South, searching for avenues by which to revive Jaffa’s distant (Pre-Palestinian) glory. A postmodernist discourse promoting authenticity and tradition emerged, rejecting the modernist vision of redeeming and ordering space (Levine, 2001; Hatuka and Kallus, 2006). This outlook was created within an Orientalist framework romanticising the ‘Old Jaffa’ (Monterescu, 2009a) whilst advocating the construction of ‘New Jaffa’ according to the rationality and neutrality of market forces. Professional knowledge, transmitted through planners, was used to legitimise the processes and outcomes of projects promoting gentrification and tourism development.

“In the face of creeping dislocation, accompanied… by daily media and television portrayals of Jaffa as both poor and crime-ridden, and chic, exotic and romantic (and thus the ideal tourist site)” (Levine, 2001, 241), neglected ‘Miserable’ Jaffa was successfully juxtaposed with economic opportunity (Figure 3.6). Architecture began to reflect these sentiments employing forms such as arches and ornament with ‘Oriental’ motifs to inspire a new-old Jaffan style. Artists, who had settled in Jaffa in the 1970s, set up their studios in the Old City, an attraction that enhanced the image of Jaffa as a multicultural, quaint centre of co-existence (Levine, 2001; Monterescu, 2009a). By the end of the 1990s Jaffa was no longer solely a site for the erasure of Palestinian space, rather it was in transition to become the ‘jewel of Tel Aviv’ (Levine, 2001).

Figure 3.6 “Historical Site” marker
Tourist signs in the Old City of Jaffa are in Hebrew and English.
3.2 Planning as Domination: Towards Territorial, Procedural and Socio-economic Control

The Israeli Planning System

Underpinning the development of Israel was a planning system that generated an ethnic division of space, a process through which parallel social conditions were created. The centrality of the state was a feature of this system, ensured through the development of ‘fractured regions’ (Yiftachel, 2001) that prevented any territorial contiguity between Palestinian cities, towns and villages. Large cities became nodes for political control and were the sole link between towns and villages. Central government demarcated regional, municipal, and educational borders to support the stratification of citizenship through corresponding services (Yiftachel, 2006). As ethnic groups were segregated in space, justified through legal measures, it became logical to extend this condition to the distribution of services, especially education, housing, and infrastructure. These territorial and procedural barriers had lasting effects on socio-economic development.

Before 1948 Jewish control of the land that was to become Israel was 8.5% (Yiftachel, 2006). These purchases were largely driven by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), whose purpose was to acquire land for Jewish development in Palestine. A process of land confiscation was rapidly put forth after the 1948 War to increase Jewish control of space. Land belonging to Palestinian refugees was transferred to the state, and even Palestinians who remained within its borders, had an estimated 40-60% of their land expropriated, a process legalised by the Absentee Property Law in 1950. The majority of Jewish immigrants were settled in newly established villages and towns on this newly acquired land (Yiftachel, 2006).

While planning promoted the Jewish control of space it also aimed to restrict Arab expansion (Ghanem, 2000). The Israeli Land Authority (ILA) was established in 1960 as a coordinating body to oversee and manage state lands. The ILA is jointly controlled by the government and the JNF. Thus an international organisation representing the interests of world Jewry, the JNF, has critical decision-making powers in the allocation of state land, covering 93% of Israel. Laws were adopted to prevent the sale of this state land, which effectively ensures continued Jewish control. Instead, land is leased to cooperatives that have the power to include, or exclude, any potential members that do not align with their lifestyle and belief systems (Yiftachel, 2006). This procedural process naturally allows discrimination against the Palestinian population who has little access to non-urban land. Further, Palestinians who are able to retain or acquire new land are often plagued by restrictions on ownership and land-use (Yiftachel, 2006), illustrating the state’s power over the territorial component of planning policy.

At the urban scale, local municipalities are overseen by the Ministry of Interior, which must approve the duties and remit of local government (Leibovitz, 2007). Generally, urban governments are responsible for the distribution of state services and the representation of their constituencies at the national level. Their plans must be approved by regional and national planning bodies, which include the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, the Jewish Agency and the JNF (Ghanem, 2000). However, some exceptions to this top-down structure occur, especially in the economic centre of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, which has initiated its own policies and projects (Leibovitz, 2007). While Israel has witnessed incremental democratisation since its founding, this has often been undermined by a bureaucratic and concealed planning system that continues to promote an ethnic division of space.

Jaffa: Site of ‘Creeping Apartheid’?

Present-day Jaffa is subject to intense forces of development geared towards tourism and gentrification based on postmodern visions of authenticity and co-existence. The former modernist approach had prescribed the demolition of old buildings and discouraged infrastructure investment (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009). These developments, or lack thereof, had clearly illustrated the uneven distribution of resources between Tel Aviv and Jaffa. However Jaffa is now a priority for the Tel Aviv-Jaffa municipality (Tel Aviv Foundation, 2010) though its strategy has been one of the “neoliberal production of locality” (Monterescu, 2009b, 408). Urban space has been designed to produce an artificial sense of community and history. The Old City in particular has been developed largely to promote the Israeli narrative of history.
Marketing Jaffa as a space for co-existence of diverse communities is another approach used to attract investment and development to the area. The location of the Peres Peace House (the headquarters for the Peres Center for Peace) in the al-Ajami neighbourhood is an example of this trend. Its location in Jaffa was intended to serve as an “important hub for Arab-Israeli endeavours and initiatives, thereby advancing peaceful relations in the Middle East” (The Peres Center for Peace, 2010a). However the project has jeopardised its goal of projecting a sense of mutual trust, cooperation and reconciliation. The modernist architecture was purposefully disconnected from its surroundings in order to be “a symbol of inventiveness, innovation, and change” (ibid.). Instead, it comes across as insensitive and complacent. It literally turns its back on the Arab community and open up towards the sea (Figure 3.8). There is no indication of community participation during the design phase of the project (Levine, 2004), which is incompatible with an organisation whose mission is to “build an...
infrastructure of peace and reconciliation by and for the people of the Middle East” (The Peres Center for Peace, 2010b). Rather the architecture has promoted the opposite image. It is perceived as alien in its urban context in all physical, mental and social fields of space.

Gentrification has also become a serious threat to the current residents of Jaffa (Figure 3.9). Until the 1990s, the vast majority of land in Jaffa had been managed and administered by semi-state agencies. However private developers have been given increasing authority to design housing and commercial projects (Monterescu, 2009b). High prices in Tel Aviv, the new appeal of Jaffa as a cultural and tourism hub and views of the Mediterranean Sea, have combined to make the al-Ajami neighbourhood particularly susceptible to gentrification trends (Figure 3.10). Generally three phases of gentrification can be identified in the area, beginning with the artists from the 1970s, the self-described ‘bobos’ (bourgeois bohemians) in the 1980s and, most recently, the economic elites who partake in international investment (Monterescu, 2009b). The influx of these groups has promoted
an ‘ethnogentrification’, which has had severe repercussions on the production of urban space and notions of citizenship.

The Andromeda Hill development is a fitting illustration of the intersection of these discourses in Jaffa. The project, conceived as luxury residences nestled in Jaffa’s “picturesque, exotic alleyways” (Andromeda Hill, 2010), suggests its location was driven more by an Oriental romanticism than its adjacency to the sea (Monterescu, 2009b). Further, the project’s name takes its origins from Greek mythology, and actively promotes this triumphal legend with Jaffa’s current process of renewal (Levine, 2001). The conceived spaces produced by these marketing strategies (Figure 3.11) only serve to detach the project from its immediate neighbours. Thus despite advertising itself as a driver for positive change in Jaffa, Andromeda Hill is essentially a closed ‘enclave’ within the city. This typology of separation, as articulated by the gated community (Monterescu, 2009b) attempts to blend the sentiments of nostalgia with the comforts of modern life.

From its inception, the project indicated its apathy towards Jaffa and its residents. It was developed by a Jewish Canadian entrepreneur, who had signed a long-term lease with the Greek Orthodox Church, the owner of the land. The church had regularly entered into similar agreements, but this particular transaction created controversy amongst the Arab constituency in Jaffa. As patriarchs are required to be born in Greece, local agendas tended to be superseded by international ones (Monterescu, 2009b). Rather than develop the land to respond to local community needs the patriarch pursued a strategy that would financially benefit the Church’s wider organisation.

The Arab community, led by local organisations al-Rabita and the Orthodox Charity Association, lodged multiple objections to the project. These did not lead to any significant changes though the municipality did pressure the developer into providing space for public use. After some delay this function was finally fulfilled through the construction of a public synagogue (Monterescu, 2009b). This inherently excluded Palestinians in Jaffa from the benefits of this ‘planning gain’, a supposed procedural mechanism that should affect the public equally.

Physically, the site and architecture are out of scale with their surroundings (Figure 3.12). A neo-Orientalist design was employed to reduce the mass of the building, though this just serves to reinforce its superficial sitting in Jaffa. Entrance to the development was restricted, preventing a connection to the sea from one of Jaffa’s main arteries, Yefet Street (Figure 3.13). This form of territorial control thus went beyond the visible borders of the site, impeding existing patterns of movement and influencing the production of perceived and lived space. The project was marketed heavily to high-income Jewish-Israelis and foreigners, using an English website and printed marketing materials in both English and French. This strategy appears to have been successful – 30% of the tenants are foreigners. The production of space – perceived,

Figure 3.11 Andromeda Hill logo
(Andromeda Hill, 2010)
Figure 3.12 Andromeda Hill

Figure 3.13 Site plan, Andromeda Hill
(Adapted from MAPA Publishers, 2009)
conceived and lived - has amplified the view that Andromeda Hill is an exclusive ethnoclass space, reserved for wealthy Jews (Monterescu, 2009b). Effectively, the only connection to Jaffa is through apartment windows, which frame views of the Mediterranean Sea, an irony not lost on local Palestinians who understand the project as a barometer for future threats to Jaffa’s coastal areas.

In parallel to this process of gentrification is one of de-Arabization, as evidenced by the recent surge in housing evictions. An estimated 500 families are currently under threat of eviction from their homes, despite having lived in them for decades. Land prices in Jaffa have swollen in recent years, a trend low-income communities view with suspicion and concern, as their socio-economic standing has not seen a parallel rise. As such, the issue of housing and eviction is considered to be the most critical for the Palestinian community in Jaffa (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009).

As gentrification has infiltrated the area, a new architectural style for al-Ajami has been championed and enforced by the state. All new renovations must abide by these building codes, which often dictate materials and fixtures too expensive for poor communities. These territorial restrictions prevent residents from upgrading their homes and thus effectively encourage them to move to less expensive areas with fewer regulations. However, within Tel Aviv-Jaffa no other Arab neighbourhoods have been planned with services to meet Palestinian needs. Therefore those that leave Jaffa often move to far locations in other ‘mixed’ cities or Arab towns (Galili, 2007).

A combination of eviction orders and hefty fines is issued in the case of structures that have been constructed without legal permits. It is common practice in Jaffa to build extensions to homes or erect internal partitions to allow multiple generations of a family to live in the same flat (Sherwood, 2010). Due to procedural constraints set by the Absentee Property Law, residents who are leasing this property must not only have the permission of the state to renovate, but also must obtain the state's consent to pay for half of the works. Such agreements with the state are uncommon and therefore families plan their own development, regardless of formal laws. In the context of their socio-economic reality, Palestinians find it daunting to respond to these territorial shifts and procedural constraints.

Jaffa is currently exposed to development that, while driven by market forces, is underpinned by socio-economic and political realities that skew development further along ethnoclass lines. This process questions the validity of liberal values, which pursue an agenda of universal interests, and exposes how they can, in reality, promote exclusion and alienation (Monterescu, 2009b). Attempts have also been made to create an invisible border between ‘North’ Jaffa and ‘South’ Jaffa, presumably to suggest that the North is better aligned with Tel Aviv. This is exemplified by the use of “Northsiders” by local residents to describe the influx of wealthy newcomers (Monterescu, 2009b).

The developments described above have been articulated by Yiftachel (2009) as processes of ‘creeping apartheid’. He argues that urban spaces today are exposed to a re-emergence of colonial relations, which result in the exploitation of disadvantaged groups and the dichotomisation of identity. This creates “a range of unequal urban citizenship(s)” (Yiftachel, 2009, 93). While this discrimination is not blatant, therefore warranting the use of ‘creeping’, its growth is evident and sustained under the cloak of universal, liberal planning policies. Formal citizenship is used to conceal the limits of substantive citizenship. Marginalised groups are driven to employ innovative solutions and strategies to respond to these new dynamics, resulting in increasing levels of urban informality and the emergence of organised urban social movements.
3.3 Planning as Opposition: Towards Equality, Diversity and Democracy

From an Ethnic (Arab) to a National (Palestinian) Minority?

Serious efforts at civil organisation amongst Palestinian-Israelis began with the cessation of military rule in 1966 (Ghanem, 2000). The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 further spurred national consciousness, ironically uniting Palestinians albeit crudely. The Council of Heads of Arab Local Councils was founded in 1974 to provide a platform for coordination and cooperation between Arab cities and villages. This was followed, in 1976, by the first public protest by Arabs in Israel, significant as it focused on the confiscation of Arab property. This event, named Land Day, was met with Israeli repression and resulted in the deaths of 6 Palestinians. It is still commemorated by Palestinians inside Israel, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in the Diaspora each year.

The next decade saw further growth in Palestinian social and political organisation. These organisations recognised citizenship as a platform for the assertion of their group rights (Jamal, 2002) especially in the desired autonomy over education and communication systems. Israel’s democratic features provide minority groups with some room for manoeuvre, particularly through protest in public space and through legal channels, which have resulted in some favourable rulings with regards to land allocation (Yiftachel, 2002). In this regard, organisations operating at the national level, including BIMKOM (an Israeli human rights organisation focused on planning and social justice), the Arab Centre of Alternative Planning and Adalah – The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, have created the political and legal foundations for the struggle for a spatial justice to be realised via democratic channels.

Though implicitly regarded as an ethnic Arab minority, Palestinians are effectively and formally treated as religious minorities by the state⁴. While a growing number of movements and organisations - religious, ideological, or territorial – were established to represent Arab concerns, no unitary Palestinian cause or demand had been articulated collectively (Ghanem, 2000). However, since the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000, these organisations have shifted their discourse to emphasise a national struggle that relates to Palestinians outside Israel (Yiftachel, 2002). Previously there was an implicit focus on equal rights and a strategy of working within the political system, but in recent years the scope of these movements has widened to include the desire to be recognised as a national minority and gain autonomy over cultural institutions (Ghanem, 2000).

The struggle has, therefore, broadened from the right to equality to that of diversity. The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel and the High Follow-up Committee has issued a document entitled “The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel” that attempted to outline a “clear strategic future vision for the Arab Palestinians in Israel” (2006, 3). A section was devoted to “Land, Planning, and Housing Policy of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel” (National Committee, 2006, 10), which suggests that planning will be a major component of any agenda for Palestinian-Israelis at national level organisation. Importantly the Committee also recognised that representation from the ‘mixed’ cities was needed in order to develop an effective leadership framework.

Jaffa: Site of Resistance?

It was not until the 1970s that the Palestinian community in Jaffa had the capacity to establish institutionalised mechanisms to represent its interests and concerns. The end of military rule in 1966 coupled with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 created conditions that encouraged the community to organise itself as Palestinians. Their influence in Jaffa spread with the growth of their population and its extension beyond al-Ajami. Second generation Palestinian-Israelis, less inhibited by the memory of the 1948 War, were able to achieve a degree of economic success, which was

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⁴ The official Ministry of Tourism site, www.goisrael.com, categorises Druze, Bedouins, and Muslims as ‘Ethnic Groups’. Interestingly, Christians are not identified here. Instead they are featured in their own tab, which includes ‘Israel Christian’ tourist sites.
invested back into the community (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009). Together, they organised to restore historic Arab public buildings, mosques and churches.

Although Arabs overwhelmingly resided in Jaffa, to gain employment they regularly travelled to Tel Aviv, where the difference in urban services was glaring. While their awareness of discrimination in planning was widespread, Palestinians in Jaffa did not have the confidence to act. Economic dependency on Tel Aviv and its Jewish residents prompted Palestinians to accept the status quo and reflect that their situation was better than Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Most recently, however, local movements have begun to widen their scope and sophistication, despite the structural constraints imposed by the state. While these urban social movements are unable to fully implement their own vision of planning that challenges the production of space, they use alternative forms of advocacy and have achieved some concrete results related to housing, education and urban services (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009; Levine, 2001).

In 1979 community activists founded Al-Rabita, the League for the Arabs in Jaffa, which would become an advocate for the preservation of Palestinian culture and lobby against discriminatory urban policies (Levine, 2007). Thus the organisation is centred on group deprivation whilst comprising nationalist undertones (Leibovitz, 2007). It believes that the preservation of Palestinian identity is at the core of its struggle, and a key component of its attainment is to educate the youth about Palestinian culture and history (al-Rabita, 2010). As all public space permeates the history of Israel / Palestine from a Jewish-Israeli perspective, this is particularly critical.
Al-Rabita has also liaised with the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality in relation to regulatory frameworks and the maldistribution of urban services between Tel Aviv and Jaffa. It has been involved with issues surrounding housing and evictions, lobbying local and national governments and supporting local figures that run for electoral office (Monterescu, 2009a). Both Muslims and Christians are members of al-Rabita and today some activist-oriented Jewish-Israelis also take part in its initiatives. As such, al-Rabita has taken a multi-faceted approach, addressing the rights to equality, diversity and democracy, in their representation of the interests of Palestinians in Jaffa.

The rise of the second intifada in 2000 stimulated the consciousness of Palestinians in Jaffa, to be aware of their predicament and the role of the Israeli state in their own repression as well as that of their fellow Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Diaspora. Tensions escalated between Jewish and Palestinian populations, resulting in the outbreak of riots. An unofficial economic boycott of Jaffa by Tel Aviv residents (Monterescu, 2007) ensued and underscored the economic vulnerability of the Palestinian community. Violence at the Hassan Bey Mosque (Figure 3.14), located in Manshiya, symbolised the conflict over lived space, a reminder that the present tensions were merely ramifications of the past. These events shadowed the developments such as Andromeda Hill and reasserted Jaffa as the undesirable, dangerous neighbourhood of the 1970s. However, for others this period strengthened their resolve to reject the ethnic nature of the state and search for genuine alternative lifestyles within an ethnocratic environment. Palestinian-Jewish organisations and projects proliferated, their bases in Jaffa (Figure 3.15). In contrast to the prevailing neo-Orientalist discourse, these movements were rooted in joint post-Zionist political activism. In this vein, the first bookstore since 1948 to specialise in Arabic literature was opened in Jaffa (Monterescu, 2009a). Founded by a Palestinian and a Jew in 2003, it was called the Yafa Café after the Arabic name for Jaffa (Figure 3.16).

The Yafa Café has relatively rapidly become a centre for political and cultural activity, a space for the contestation of the dominant paradigm and the creation of alternatives. Palestinian national holidays, cultural figures, and current political
events are discussed, debated and commemorated at the café (Figure 3.17). It provides a space for a re-articulation and sharing of lived space and for the study of Palestinian conceived space. The Yafa Café is a site for activist meetings and the starting point for Jaffa tours that offer a counter-Zionist narrative of the city’s history. Thus the Yafa Café provides a space to criticise current processes of gentrification and renewal and promote alternative views of rights.

To respond to the processes and the threats of evictions the Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Land and Housing Rights was established in 2007 (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009). Consisting of 20-25 regular members, it has already registered as an NGO and has three members who offer their services as lawyers and social workers to support the activities of the organisation. It acts as a collective representative, calling on the municipality to engage with the community as a whole, rather than with individuals. In this sense its work aims to disturb the power dynamics at play when the municipality issues eviction orders on a household basis. It actively works to include youth and women in its initiatives, which include direct action to prevent demolitions, media campaigns, public protests and legal contestations (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009). Its discourse also includes the import of economic viability, which it perceives as crucial for continued Palestinian presence in Jaffa.

In 2010, the Jaffa Popular Committee together with local organisations, including faith and partisan-based groups, formed the Jaffa Housing Coalition as a means to consolidate their advocacy for the struggle of housing and land rights (Wolfson, 2010). Their initiatives have garnered some attention, soliciting a response from current Mayor Ron Huldai, who claimed that the shortage of housing for Arab residents in Jaffa was the root of its ‘extremist elements’ (Zitun, 2010). It is debatable whether the Mayor is actually sensitive to the lack of viable housing for Palestinian citizens of Jaffa, but it is clear that political activism has prompted an urban planning policy response (if only in rhetoric). Further, it makes evident the need to understand housing policy, and by extension broader urban policy, in both equal and diverse terms.

Urban social movements in Jaffa can alternate between rights-based, nationalist, and legal discourses, which parallel approaches for equality,
diversity, and democracy. It is clear that despite little faith in the Israeli justice system, they still use formal and legal channels to further their demands. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel has recently petitioned the High Court, on behalf of Palestinian Jaffans, to cease a proposed housing project in the al-Ajami neighbourhood. This project would only be available to those in the Orthodox Jewish community and its developer has also been responsible for Jewish-only settlements in the West Bank (Sherwood, 2010). In the case of Andromeda Hill, a four-year legal battle won in 2007 forced the development to open pedestrian routes for public access in order to connect Yefet Street to the sea (Monterescu, 2009b). Though this victory has not fundamentally shifted power relations in Jaffa it does illustrate how urban social movements can use their agency to transform the perceived space imposed on them from above.

The community has also been successful in electing the first Palestinian representative from Jaffa to the Tel Aviv-Jaffa City Council. While this has not resulted in any major policy shifts, the municipality is now exposed to the concerns of Palestinian communities in Jaffa which have ranged from the state of garbage collection, the contestation of street names and signs (Figure 3.18) and the possibility of establishing a separate Jaffa municipality.

As localised issues have taken priority for Jaffan movements, “the idea of delegitimizing the Israeli state in any meaningful way, which perhaps was entertained by Islamic politicians or “binationalist” academics, has rarely been on the agenda” (Levine, 2007, 290). Politics are rarely presented in an overtly anti-Zionist framework, perhaps an indication of the cautious approach these movements must adopt, in order to maintain their room for manoeuvre. In the meantime they continue to employ their version of an “architecture of resistance” (Levine, 2007, 299) to assert their rights to equality, diversity and democracy.
Chapter Four

CONCLUSIONS

“The confused illusion that guided – or obscured – the hopes of earlier generations to be included in the Israeli project has now been replaced with a sober view of the reluctance by most mainstream Israelis to see Palestinian citizens as equals.”

(Abu Baker and Rabinowitz, 2005, 10)

4.1 City as Site for Substantive Citizenship: Implications for the Nation

Cities offer the space to “crystallise the combined effect of opportunities, constraints, mobilization and symbolism” (Leibovitz, 2007, 68), a dynamism that can encourage and sustain urban social movements. It is at this scale that movements are better capable of exploiting the cracks in the system, and of exposing the injustices in the production of urban space. Through the assertion of everyday knowledge and lived experience, movements make relevant the specificity of locality and shift discourse from the all-encompassing national scale to the more accessible local one (Fenster, 2004). Reading the production of space from a Lefebvrian perspective necessarily requires the integration of different forms of knowledge (Fenster and Yacobi, 2005). In the case of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, the production of space has been dominated by a state that has manipulated planning to offer its hegemonic version of history and vision for the future. Yet urban social movements are capable of producing different space according to their knowledge systems. They must be conscious of affecting the perceived, conceived and lived spaces, in order to assert their own interests on public discourse.

Recent policies modelled on neo-liberal ideology have resulted in greater inequalities within cities. The further stratification of citizens suggests that new alliances could be formed on the basis of class (Yiftachel, 2006), yet this has not been the experience in Tel Aviv-Jaffa where ethnic divisions predominate5. However, political affiliations have been instrumental in the alliance with Jewish activist groups, though they are natural allies given their post-Zionist outlook and their primary commitment to social justice, in contrast to ethnic dominance. A substantive citizenship formation is only possible if it addresses these relationships between citizens. Ethnic segregation should be analysed not just in terms of residence but also through the “inter-ethnic interactions in everyday life space” (Benjamini and Schnell, 2004, 445). It is in these spaces that alternatives to liberal citizenship are initially formed and embraced. While expanding these moments of ethnic interface to the effective transformation of social networks is a gradual process, it is one that begins in the production of space.

In ethnocratic states it is essential to create new spaces for the practice of citizenship, given that national objectives based on ethnic dominance permeate all facets of political and social life. The construction of citizenship can be forged at different scales (Leibovitz, 2007) and these avenues should be used to discredit the formal view of citizenship. The subject explored here is the efficacy of planning in substantive citizenship assertion at the urban scale. The state's reaction to the struggle for urban space will illuminate the locations of heterogeneity within its structure and further indicate its outlook on rights and citizenship (Leibovitz, 2007). While planning can tend to focus on local issues that spur a 'de-politicisation' of the systemic discrimination inherent at the national level, it does engage communities to link their everyday lives to their relationship with the state. This type of transformation, derived from personal, lived experience can provide the platform for a citizenship of engagement, one advocating the rights to equality, diversity and democracy. Derived from below, it requires the mobilisation of citizens in their localities and communities, a practice that is, in itself, a progression towards democracy.

### 4.2 Jaffa: Site of a Multicultural Vision?

The case of Jaffa illustrates various motivations behind ethnic protests, from notions of group deprivation to the conscious assertion of Palestinian identity. A movement can originate from any position on this spectrum and is "profoundly shaped by both social and geographical reconstruction of living space" (Yiftachel, 1997b, 96). Complex, flexible and in a sense strategic, these mobilisations cut across class, religious and ideological lines within the Palestinian community but have yet to effectively create broad alliances with other urban social movements organised in the wider Tel Aviv-Jaffa metropolis. Perhaps their protest, by its very nature, "acts as a symbol and generator of collective identity"(Yiftachel, 1997b, 95) thereby hindering their ability to engage with other social groups. Indeed, the indication is that alliances with other social groups are an unattainable luxury, at least for Palestinians who are positioned in the bottom of the stratification of citizenship. Recent trends have seen an influx of labour migrants into the city, who are engaged in their own struggle for the access to urban space. This opens the possibility for an alliance with the emerging movements working on this issue. What is clear is that the "the ongoing Nakba has brought about ongoing resistance" (Abu Shehadeh and Shbaytah, 2009) and Palestinians in Jaffa, albeit humbly, operate their movements with a conscious awareness of this reality, of linking the present struggle to the injustices of the past. Thus their internal conflicts arise not primarily in the analysis of the 'facts on the ground' but rather in how to strategise their opposition (Leibovitz, 2007).

The borders governing Jaffa have always been a point of contention, from as early as the United Nations Partition Plan, which conceived Jaffa as an Arab enclave, completely disconnected from the rest of historic Palestine. Today, invisible yet perceptible borders demarcate the transition between Jaffa and Tel Aviv (Figure 4.1). It is the overarching struggle not for Jaffa but for Tel Aviv-Jaffa as a whole that must be addressed, to mould and dissolve the psychological spatial boundaries that divide the city. It has been asserted, “Tel-Aviv became the only city in the West to which the entrance of Arabs was forbidden,” (Raz-Krakotzkin, 1998, 67). If substantive citizenship is to be realised, Palestinians must assert themselves in the spaces within Tel Aviv (Figure 4.2).
This decision to focus on the smaller scale of Jaffa or the larger scale of Tel Aviv-Jaffa is a strategic and a philosophical one. One can see the former as more realistic and an opportunity to establish a spatial entity capable of transcending ethnic identity. Recent discourse among the Palestinian leadership has indicated a strategy that would argue for Jaffa to be its own municipality. This would, in theory, allow development to better align with the desires of local residents. However, it is unlikely that the current municipality will agree to such an arrangement given the economic and historical value of Jaffa to the larger urban area. Regardless, it is clear that “the true contest concerns the locus of power to determine the scale of the struggle: who defines the place to be taken and its boundaries” (Smith, 2008, 232). Palestinians must, therefore, be conscious of the spatial scale of their struggle and place it within the corresponding levels of citizenship afforded them. Furthermore, competition over the production of conceived space will be instrumental in this process, as illustrated in the case of Manshiya (Hatuka and Kallus, 2006). Conceived as a door, bridge and gateway the area underwent transformation dictated by the rhetoric and imaginings of the dominant ethnic group, eventually implemented in physical space. Urban social movements must recognise this practice and use it to their advantage as a means to influence both the perceived and the lived spaces of Jaffa and beyond.

Given the diversity of Israeli society, as demonstrated in ethnoclass stratification, a model of “multicultural conflict” (Jamal, 2002, 421) is offered as a means for future analysis. This classification better reflects the tensions and antagonism both between and within ethnic groups. Current urban social movements suggest that Jaffa could be a site for multicultural exchange and the formation of an urban citizenship, one that is territorial, not ethnic. Though Jaffa is currently experiencing “failed attempts of liberal ‘co-existence’…new initiatives indicate a sense of agency even in a context of increased vulnerability” (Monterescu, 2009a, 667). This could very well be a result of the increased uncertainty at the national and international levels in relation to Palestinians in the West Bank and especially in the Gaza Strip. There is scope for these movements to fashion a new discourse for the city, to promote a substantive citizenship that emanates not from the limitations imposed by the state but from the expansion of rights.
articulated at the urban scale.

The growing number of NGOs that have chosen to locate in Jaffa suggests its potential as the site for a multicultural vision. Whereas it is only in ‘mixed’ cities that this type of vision can emerge, given the spatial proximity of ethnic communities, Jaffa is particularly symbolic given its proximity to Tel Aviv. The recent initiative of the Arab Democratic School of Jaffa, co-founded by al-Rabita, embodies this notion. Though still in its infancy, the school endeavours to promote both cultural autonomy and diversity, providing Arabic, English and Hebrew instruction from the first grade and presenting students with an alternative historical narrative from that espoused by the state. Clearly, such a venture requires a long-term outlook to realise perceptual transformations that could reverberate in the production of space and the formation of citizenship. Its ambitious scope is a step towards institutionalising an urban service that upholds principles of equality, diversity and democracy. Indeed, just as Tel Aviv has fashioned itself as the ‘White City’ (Figure 4.3), Jaffans must articulate their own vision, one based on multiculturalism. Otherwise, the dominant conceived space will continue to repress Jaffa, maintaining its subjugation as the Black City (Rotbard, 2005).

4.3 Towards a New Discourse of Israel / Palestine

In recent years Israel’s policies have become more radical in the separation of spatial areas. Their motivations have been “unprece dentedly obsessed with hermetic territorial closure, ghettolike existence, and secured borders, Israel’s national and urban spaces are constantly threatened by infiltration and contamination” (Monterescu, 2009b, 427). The case of Andromeda Hill is an example of this at the local scale, a gated community that is alarmingly akin to the Jewish-only settlements in the West Bank. This pattern indicates a desire to cloak oneself in safety and security from the ‘other’, both at the local, national and international scales.

Separation also continues to dominate the rhetoric at the international policy level, evident in the two states for two people solution. The scope of the conflict is limited to the West Bank and Gaza Strip with little attention paid to Palestinian refugees and Palestinian-Israeli citizens, whose grievances are not considered or even acknowledged. Any criticism of the Israeli state seeks to limit itself spatially to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, while simultaneously praising Israel for its democracy. This ignores not just the plight of Palestinian-Israelis but other ethnoclasses that face discrimination.

Figure 4.3 "Meier on Rothschild"
Richard Meier, an architect renowned for his penchant for white buildings, has designed a white tower on the famed Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv.

An example of this is Jimmy Carter’s Palestine: Peace not Apartheid, where ‘apartheid’ is clearly limited to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
within Israel. The international community has accepted rhetoric which characterises Palestinian-Israelis as a ‘demographic threat’ and which regards the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their land (now in Israel) as detrimental to the very existence of the state. In such a context it is imperative that Palestinian-Israelis position themselves in this discourse and assert their membership of the Palestinian nation.

Recently Palestinian-Israelis have offered their own vision for an inclusive Israeli society (National Committee, 2006). While this document insists that Palestinians be recognised as a national minority with cultural autonomy, it still suggests that Palestinian-Israelis have accepted their separation from any future Palestinian state (Benvenisti, 2007). Though Israel has effective control over the production of perceived space, continually reflected in the power to alter the physical landscape, there is room to offer alternatives for conceived and lived spaces. It is in these spaces that it is possible to offer a unitary vision, one that can unite Palestinians in their struggle for statehood, and reconcile the contradictions between their state and their nation.

Yet the struggle for Palestinians is more than the establishment of their statehood; it also concerns the fulfilment of everyday rights, denied to Palestinians within Israel, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in the Diaspora. The lack of progress at the international level related to the granting of these rights suggests a new strategy is necessary. Given that Palestinians in Israel have a formal citizenship with which to make claims on the state, other avenues can be created. The use of a planning as opposition, of demanding that the rights to equality, diversity and democracy be respected in their cities is one such strategy. As Harvey (2009b, 315) asserts, “the freedom to make and remake our cities is… one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.” In this sense citizenship discourse can originate from the level of the city, and therefore from its inception include substantive components as articulated by the community. Inherent to this is the right to memory and narrative as constitutive of planning rights, an argument put forth by BIMKOM (Leibovitz, 2008). It is the undermining of Palestinian culture and narrative in all of Israel / Palestine that exposes the limits to an Israeli democracy predicated on ethnicity.

Within the West Bank there is an expression about the separation wall, which describes it, not as keeping Palestinians out but as trapping Israel inside. This view contends that, being constrained by the Mediterranean Sea and Arab countries to the North and South, Israel is only further isolating itself in the region in which it desires to be a part. Yet if Palestinian-Israelis are a ‘trapped minority’ (Rabinowitz, 2001) inside this enclave, their role in this discourse of separation and partition becomes crucial. As citizens of Israel they are emblematic of both the origins of the conflict and its solution. Through their internal struggles with the state they continually seek to reform it into a democracy for all its citizens irrespective of ethnicity. Whether this multicultural vision can succeed inside Israel or be spread beyond remains to be seen. However, what is certain is that any bi-national discourse must build from the experiences of Palestinian-Israelis and it is in the ‘mixed’ cities that this ideal could first be put into practice.


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